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RADIOACTIVE VETERANS: A NEW LOOK AT THE 
NUCLEAR HISTORY OF AMERICA 
Craig M. Kabatchnick*, P. Michelle Fitzsimmons** & Jonathan 
B. Kelly*** 
“We are all students of history, a search for the truth through 
extensive research and writings, but we are also in the 
process of becoming a part of history.  You can never ask 
more from life. We will all be leaving behind a legacy for 
those who follow behind us.”1
    * This article is dedicated to my wife Ruth, my daughter Rebecca 
Ashley Kabatchnick, my mother-in-law Lilian Fink, a survivor of 
World War II in Birmingham, England, and Robert Luskin; who have 
stood by my side and supported me at all times throughout my life and 
taught me to never quit, and that we may not at times have it all 
together, but together we have it all. 
Professor Craig M. Kabatchnick is Director of the Veterans Law 
Program at North Carolina Central University School of Law, where he 
teaches Veterans Law Clinic I & II.  From 1984 to 1990 he practiced 
with his late father Neil B. Kabatchnick, before the Boards for 
Correction of Military Records within the various military departments 
in matters involving administrative military personnel law. He co-
authored an article entitled Practice Before the Boards for Correction of 
Military Records Within the Various Military Departments, 33 FED. BAR 
NEWS & J. 17, 17–21, 44 (cited as a reference in 10 U.S.C. §1552a).  
Professor Kabatchnick represented the United States Department of 
Veteran Affairs from 1990 to 1995 as an Appellate Attorney, Senior 
Appellate Attorney and Associate Special Assistant on the Appellate 
Litigation Staff Group, Office of the General Counsel, United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs before the United States Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims in over 300 cases.  From 1995 to present 
he has advocated for veterans rights and played a critical role in the 
VA claims adjudication process.  Professor Kabatchnick has written 
FOUR other articles for the Marquette Elder’s Advisor: PSTD and Its 
Effects on Elderly, Minority, and Female Veterans, 10 MARQ. ELDER’S
ADVISOR 269 (2009); The TBI Impact: The Truth About Traumatic Brain 
Injuries and Their Indeterminate Effects on Elderly, Minority, and Female 
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“The truth of the matter is that you always know the right 
thing to do.  The hard part is doing it.”2
I. HISTORY
A. BACKGROUND
In a personal letter dated August 2, 1939 from his home in 
Long Island, New York, Albert Einstein wrote to President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and stated as follows: 
Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has 
been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to 
expect that the element uranium may be turned into a 
new and important source of energy in the immediate 
future.  Certain aspects of the situation which has 
arisen seem to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, 
quick action on the part of the Administration.  I 
believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your 
attention the following facts and recommendations: 
Veterans of All Wars, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 81 (2009); Obstacles 
Faced by the Elderly Veteran in the VA Claims Adjudication Process, 12 
MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 185 (2010); and Unsung Survivors: VA Advocacy 
for the Spouses, Widows, and Children of Elderly Veterans, 13 MARQ.
ELDER’S ADVISOR 243 (2012). 
Special thanks to North Carolina Central University School of Law 
Veterans Law Program clinical students Joshua E. Byrd, Sophia V. King 
and Krystle Avecedo.  
     ** P. Michelle Fitzsimmons is a registered patent attorney who 
counsels clients in intellectual property matters and FDA regulations.  
Dr. Fitzsimmons earned her Ph.D. in Inorganic Chemistry from Wake 
Forest University, where her doctoral research focused on the synthesis 
and characterization of metal complexes for use in nuclear medicine.  
Dr. Fitzsimmons is licensed to practice law in North Carolina, the 
United States Federal Court- Middle District of North Carolina, and 
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 
      *** Jonathan Kelly is an attorney specializing in the representation 
of disabled veterans.  Kelly is licensed in the State of New York and 
admitted to practice before the Veterans’ Affairs Office of the General 
Counsel and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.   
 1.  Professor Craig M. Kabatchnick. 
 2.  General Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. 
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In the course of the last four months it has been made 
probable – through the work of Joliot in France as well 
as Fermi and Szilard in America – that it may become 
possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large 
mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and 
large quantities of new radium-like elements would be 
generated.  Now it appears almost certain that this 
could be achieved in the immediate future. 
 This new phenomenon would also lead to the 
construction of bombs, and it is conceivable – though 
much less certain – that extremely powerful bombs of a 
new type may thus be constructed.  A single bomb of 
this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might 
very well destroy the whole port together with some of 
the surrounding territory.  However, such bombs might 
very well prove to be too heavy for transportation by 
air. 
 The United States has only very poor ores of uranium 
in moderate quantities.  There is some good ore in 
Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, while the most 
important source of uranium is Belgian Congo. 
In view of this situation you may think it desirable to 
have some permanent contact maintained between the 
Administration and the group of physicists working on 
chain reactions in America.  One possible way of 
achieving might be for you to entrust with this task a 
person who has your confidence and who could 
perhaps serve in an inofficial [sic] capacity.  His task 
might comprise the following: 
 a) to approach Government Departments, keep them 
informed of the further development, and put forward 
recommendations for Government action, giving 
particular attention to the problem of securing a supply 
of uranium ore for the United States; 
 b) to speed up the experimental work, which is at 
present being carried on within the limits of the 
budgets of University laboratories, by providing funds, 
if such funds be required, through his contacts with 
private persons who are willing to make contributions 
for this cause, and perhaps also by obtaining the co-
operation of industrial laboratories which have the 
necessary equipment. 
 I understand that Germany has actually stopped the 
sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines which 
she has taken over.  That she should have taken such 
early action might perhaps be understood on the 
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ground that the son of the German Under-Secretary of 
State, von Weizsäcker, is attached to the Kaiser-
Wilhelm-Institut [sic] in Berlin where some of the 
American work on uranium is now being repeated.3
Thus, with this single letter from Dr. Albert Einstein to 
President Franklin Roosevelt, dated just one day after the 
German invasion of Poland and the subsequent start of World 
War II, the race to build the first atomic bomb began.4  In 
December 1938, a chemist in a German laboratory made a 
discovery, which would culminate to the creation and use of two 
nuclear bombs on Japanese civilian populations in August 1945 
(Hiroshima and Nagasaki) both of which had no military value 
whatsoever at that time.  Within ten months, the world would 
become engulfed in World War II, a “total war,” whereupon 
Germany, led by a ruthless dictator, Adolph Hitler, would 
control, except for Great Britain, the entire Western and Eastern 
Europe portions of the European continent by 1940, and 
subsequently the Soviet Union in 1941-1942.  The 1938 discovery 
by a German chemist in Nazi Germany that a uranium atom 
would split in two when placed next to radioactive material 
would begin a nuclear arms race; the initial purpose being to 
deny Nazi Germany and Adolph Hitler military dominance over 
the entire world. 
This race to build the first atomic bomb, the most 
formidable weapon ever known to mankind, a weapon that 
would eventually threaten the very existence of every country in 
the world, would involve the world’s greatest chemists and 
scientists. 
By 1942, many major cities had been bombed.  Initially, 
General Curtis LeMay’s bombing strategy included the 
industrial targets in the heartland of Germany, but at a great cost 
 3.  Letter from Albert Einstein (with Leo Szilard), to President Franklin 
Roosevelt (Aug. 2, 1939) (on file at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum), 
available at http://media.nara.gov/Public_Vaults/00762_.pdf. 
 4.  Unless otherwise footnoted all the information in this historical section 
comes from two related sources: OLIVER STONE & PETER KUZNICK, THE UNTOLD 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 87–226 (2012) and Oliver Stone’s Untold History of the 
United States (Showtime television series, 2012). 
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to the American bomber pilots.  It was in 1943 that General 
LeMay and British General Arthur “Bomber” Harris started the 
indiscriminate use of American daylight bombing, along with 
British bombing at night, against German civilian centers.  In the 
summer of 1943, the Americans and the British bombed and 
destroyed the city of Hamburg.  Later that year, the German city 
of Munster was bombed and destroyed.  In February 1945, the 
city of Dresden was completely destroyed by British and 
American bombings.  Dresden had little military value; 
however, it is estimated that more than 500,000 German civilians 
died as a result of the bombing.  By mid-April 1944 there was 
little military value left in bombing Germany, and it was also 
known to American intelligence that the Germans had stopped 
their atomic bomb program in favor of the V-1 flying bomb and 
V-2 rocket projects. 
The war with Germany ended with their surrender on May 
8, 1945.  But the American hatred toward Japan was exhibited 
with great ferocity after the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Further 
hatred toward the Japanese people was exacerbated by reports 
in 1944 of Japanese atrocities against American and British 
Prisoners of War (POWs) during the Philippine death march, 
and in many other instances. 
In late 1944, General LeMay transferred to Japan and started 
a campaign of indiscriminate “terror” bombings of Japanese 
civilian centers, similar to the practice he had initiated in allied 
bombings of Germany in World War II.  In March of 1945 the 
Allied forces were capturing more and more Japanese occupied 
territories, thus bringing Allied bombers that much closer to the 
Japanese mainland.  In March 1945 General LeMay ordered 330 
bombers to attack Tokyo with incendiary bombs, white 
phosphorous, and other flammable material.  This was 
devastating to the city because there were large amounts of 
bamboo and wood throughout Tokyo.  That raid killed more 
than 100,000 civilians, while leaving another one million 
homeless.  The Allied Air Force firebombed at least 100 other 
targets in Japan, some with no military significance; these raids 
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killed an additional 500,000 Japanese.  Yet, the Japanese would 
not surrender under “unconditional” terms, fearing the loss of 
their Emperor Hirohito. 
Given the terrible costs of General LeMay’s “terror” 
bombings of civilian targets, the atomic bomb seemed to be the 
logical next step in trying to force the Japanese into 
unconditional surrender.  The atomic bomb constructed and 
successfully tested on July 16, 1945, was, in fact, a prototype of 
what was to come in the future. 
Key facts led to President Truman’s decision to utilize the 
atomic bomb.  In May 1945, in taking over the island of Iwo Jima 
after five weeks of combat, the United States lost over 7,000 
soldiers, while another 18,000 were wounded.  Furthermore, at 
Okinawa, after 82 days of combat and what was the bloodiest 
battle of the Pacific War, over 12,000 Americans were killed 
and/or missing and 36,000 were wounded.  The Japanese lost 
over 100,000 troops and an equivalent number of civilians while 
defending this island.  Another key fact leading to the use of the 
atomic bomb was the sinking of the USS Indianapolis, which 
resulted in a dreadful loss of life when the ship was secretly 
returning to the Philippines after delivering the components of 
the atomic bomb to the island of Tinian. 
In this regard, in the summer of 1945 it was President 
Truman’s firm belief that, although the Japanese were essentially 
defeated from a military perspective, any invasion of the main 
islands by American forces would still result in the loss of 
hundreds of thousands of American lives.  Furthermore, many 
world and American military leaders, including Churchill and 
Truman, believed that the Soviet Union represented an even 
bigger threat.  The use of the atomic bomb would be an 
extraordinary show of strength, one that changed the face of the 
world. 
Under the leadership of Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, the 
Manhattan Project, which involved many of the world’s top 
physicists, scientists, and chemists, working together in Chicago, 
Illinois and Los Alamos, New Mexico, secretly completed the 
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construction of the atomic bomb.  This successful construction 
and detonation of the first atomic bomb, a plutonium implosion 
bomb, was completed on July 16, 1945, at the Los Alamos test 
site in New Mexico, at a site code named Trinity. 
In July 1945, the three major allied powers, the United 
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, were to meet at 
Potsdam, Germany to determine the future status of post-war 
Europe.  President Truman delayed the Potsdam Conference for 
two weeks, in hopes of hearing the positive outcome of the July 
16 Trinity blast at Los Alamos.  Upon hearing the news of the 
successful blast at the Trinity test site at Los Alamos, President 
Truman immediately notified British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin.  Stalin was shocked 
and furious, for his intelligence had only informed him that the 
United States was in the process of constructing a nuclear bomb, 
not of its completion and subsequent successful test shot.  This 
marked the start of the nuclear arms race between the United 
States and the Soviet Union; an arms race that gave countries the 
ability to develop such a formidable weapon, with a capacity to 
grant any country a vast capability of military dominance over 
the entire world, and thereby introduce the world’s most 
devastating manmade weapon. 
During the course of World War II President Harry Truman 
repeatedly reiterated President Roosevelt’s original call for the 
unconditional surrender of the Imperial Japanese forces.  
However, on July 16, 1945, after the successful test shot at 
Trinity, President Truman had a new weapon that could destroy 
entire cities, and beyond.  It was hoped by Truman that the use 
of such a bomb would force the Japanese into unconditional 
surrender. 
On August 1, 1945, the Soviet Union invaded northern 
Manchuria and northern Japan.  Then, on August 5, 1945, the 
Soviet Union declared war on Japan.  The main fear for the 
Japanese was that under the terms of unconditional surrender 
they would lose their Emperor Hirohito, who was the equivalent 
of a god to the Japanese people.  However, President Truman 
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would ultimately decide that use of the atomic bomb would end 
the war on American terms, and that he wanted it done as soon 
as possible in the face of the Soviet Union’s declaration of war 
against the Japanese.  President Truman wanted a swift end to 
war and a decisive end to the war with Japan. 
Therefore, on the morning of August 6, 1945, at 8:15 a.m., 
with great secrecy, a single American B-29 bomber named the 
“Enola Gay” dropped a single uranium bomb, “Little Boy,” 
which contained the equivalent of 20,000 tons of trinitrotoluene 
(TNT), on the city of Hiroshima, Japan.  Hiroshima was selected 
as the first of three sites for the use of the atomic bomb because it 
had not previously been bombed and was not of any military 
significance.  In an instant Hiroshima was destroyed, killing at 
least 70,000 people.  In addition, there were an estimated 100,000 
civilians who would die of wounds, burns, and radiation 
exposure.  In many instances it would be years, and even 
decades, before thousands of people would die of radiation 
poisoning resulting from exposure to that atomic bomb. 
President Truman, in his first radio address, described the 
first atomic bomb and its impact on the city of Hiroshima.  
President Truman further stated that the war started as a result 
of the Japanese bombing at Pearl Harbor, and that they had been 
repaid manifold.  He stated that the atomic bomb exhibited the 
harnessing power of the universe. 
Yet, the Japanese government still refused to surrender.  
Therefore on August 9, 1945, at Tinian, a B-29 was loaded with 
the second atomic bomb, nicknamed “Fat Man,” a plutonium 
implosion bomb, similar to the bomb successfully tested at Los 
Alamos.  The second target was to be the city of Kokura and the 
backup target was Nagasaki.  As with Hiroshima, both cities 
were chosen because they were untouched by American 
bombing and had little military value.  Therefore, consistent 
with General LeMay’s long-standing belief in “terror bombings,” 
both atomic bombings of the Japanese civilian population were 
deliberately targeted for shock effect.  Cloud cover obscured 
Kokura, the primary target site, and the B-29 carrying the second 
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atomic bomb faced anti-aircraft fire.  Therefore, the destiny of 
Nagasaki, the backup target site, was sealed. 
Fat Man exploded over Nagasaki with the force of 22,000 
tons of TNT, larger than the Hiroshima bomb, and instantly 
killed at least 40,000 people.  Furthermore, tens of thousands of 
Japanese civilians were fatally wounded, while others died of 
radiation poisoning.  Thereafter, the Japanese surrendered on 
August 15, 1945.  Thus, the nuclear arms race between the 
United States and the Soviet Union gained momentum, which 
would forever change the fate of the world in which we live.  On 
August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union successfully exploded their 
first atomic bomb, an exact duplicate of the American plutonium 
implosion bomb, Little Boy, tested at test site Trinity, with a 
force of 20,000 tons of TNT.  The Americans detected the Soviet 
test blast when an American aircraft flying over the Western 
Pacific detected high levels of radiation in the atmosphere.  This 
single atomic test blast by the Soviet Union seriously expanded 
the Cold War in 1949.  This was best exemplified by American 
development and successful test of the hydrogen bomb in the 
Pacific on November 1, 1952.  The hydrogen bomb exploded 
with the force of ten megatons, equivalent to ten million tons of 
TNT (more than 500 times more powerful than the first atomic 
bomb that destroyed Hiroshima). 
The United States would conduct numerous atomic blasts 
between 1946 and 1962.  Several of these atomic blasts were 
conducted in the Western Pacific, most especially: the Bikini and 
Marshall Islands, the Nevada Test Site, Camp Desert Rock, and 
in Alaska.  Soldiers were ordered to charge towards detonated 
nuclear bombs to assess troop maneuverability, and battleship 
and airplane readiness were tested with both underwater and 
atmospheric nuclear detonations.5  Thus, in the interest of 
national security and military strategy, the U.S. military trained 
 5.  DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, DEP’T OF DEF., DNA 6014F, OPERATION UPSHOT-
KNOTHOLE 66, 76–77 (1953); Frank Munger, Atomic Vet Recalls 1946 Bomb Tests – and 
Dirty Aftermath, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2008, 
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/sep/21/atomic-vet-recalls/. 
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with nuclear bombs between 1945 and 1962.  Nuclear bombs are 
different from traditional bombs that relied on chemical 
reactions like TNT6 – as nuclear bombs generate nuclear wind 
gusts, excessive heat, radiation, and other environmental 
phenomena.7  For this reason, the U.S. military had to learn how 
to use nuclear weapons in the traditional arenas of war, 
including land, air, and sea.8  These missions were used to 
“determine the effects of nuclear detonations on military 
offensive and defensive systems.”9  These nuclear tests exposed 
thousands of veterans in a reckless fashion to lethal amounts of 
radiation, with the support of very few accurate or reliable 
radiation dosemetry badges or devices, and with reckless 
disregard to the dangers of lethal radiation exposure, either due 
to the radiation blast itself or radiation fallout thereafter. 
During Operation “Crossroads” in 1946, the United States 
conducted both an atmospheric blast as well as an underwater 
test blast.  These two blasts were identified as Shot “Able” and 
Shot “Baker.”  Numerous naval vessels and naval personnel 
participated in Operation Crossroads.  The water in and around 
the Bikini Islands and Bikini Atoll was highly contaminated with 
radiation; and, the ballast utilized on the ships contained this 
highly contaminated water.  Moreover, when sea water was 
sprayed on the ships, the puddles of water that gathered on the 
ship were contaminated with radioactive isotopes.  Yet, ships 
were allowed to travel into Bikini Atoll just twenty hours after 
the nuclear blast, exposing thousands of naval personnel to 
excessive amounts of lethal radiation.  Tragically, the radioactive 
 6.  See U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC 
BOMBINGS OF HIROSHIMA & NAGASAKI 30–41 (1946), available at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/document
s/pdfs/65.pdf. 
 7.  Id.
 8.  See, e.g., ERNEST A. PINSON ET AL., PROJECT 2.66A, OPERATION REDWING 
PACIFIC PROVING GROUNDS – PRELIMINARY REPORT, EARLY CLOUD PENETRATIONS 
(1956), available at http://www.hss.energy.gov/healthsafety/ihs/marshall/ 
collection/data/ihp1c/0898_a.pdf; DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, supra note 5, at 66, 76–77. 
 9.  U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR TESTS JULY 1945 THROUGH 
SEPTEMBER 1992 viii (2000). 
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fallout from Shot Able and Shot Baker in the Bikini Islands 
during Operation Crossroads was so lethal and extensive that 
the innocent residents of those islands had to be evacuated 
permanently.  The former residents of the Bikini Islands would 
later be compensated due to the fact that they were displaced by 
the radioactive exposure and fallout caused by Shot Able and 
Shot Baker during Operation Crossroads. 
The numerous Nevada nuclear test blasts in the 1950s 
created their own set of problems for military personnel.  The 
sites of the atomic test blasts were located in Nevada, which is 
by its very nature extremely dry, and therefore, many of the 
atomic test blasts were labeled “dirty blasts.”  The inherent risks 
of releasing large amounts of ionized dust particles into the 
atmosphere during the Nevada atomic test blasts were quite 
high, exposing cities, local towns, and communities to lethal 
amounts of radioactive fallout, thus resulting in higher rates of 
cancer, and other diseases linked to radiation exposure.  The 
classic example of the effects of fallout on a civilian population 
was Shot “Harry.”  The intent of the military during Shot Harry 
was to avoid fallout hitting Salt Lake City and Las Vegas.  Shot 
Harry turned out to be a dirty blast, with a vast amount of 
ionized dust particles shooting up into the atmosphere.  That 
fallout headed straight toward St. George, Utah, where a wind 
shear brought the fallout straight over and down onto the city 
with tragic consequences.  At the time of Shot Harry, residents 
of St. George, Utah remember seeing a “pink cloud” over the 
city.  In the future, cancer clusters developed throughout the 
population of St. George, Utah, resulting in litigation against the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). 
Veterans who served in the Nevada and West Pacific 
nuclear test blasts were treated by the military without much 
sophistication or science.  Despite their exposure to lethal doses 
of radiation, little attention was paid to their future well being.  
For example, to test exposure to nuclear blasts, the military 
merely placed houses, buildings of adobe, and pigs—whose skin 
is similar to humans—in the vicinity of the Nevada test sites. 
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In addition, veterans were ordered to stand in close 
proximity to the test site and ordered to stare at the stem of the 
blast, such as in “Upshot-Knothole,” Shot “Badger,” and Shot 
“Grable” in area Five of the Nevada nuclear test-site on May 23, 
1953.  These and other veterans were ordered to squat or stand 
in shallow slit trenches and then to charge the stem of the 
nuclear blast.  They were ordered to remain at the test site for 
days after the initial nuclear test blast, forcing them to eat food 
and remain in quarters contaminated with ionized dust 
particles.  They oftentimes wore the same uniforms 
contaminated with ionized dust particles for numerous days. 
At Camp Desert Rock in Nevada the U.S. military began 
using smaller atomic blasts to learn how to fight a nuclear war.  
On April 22, 1952, approximately 2,000 Army personnel 
conducted maneuvers beneath the mushroom cloud of the Shot 
“Charlie” nuclear detonation.  The 31-kiloton explosion was one 
of the largest ever conducted in Nevada to that date.  The United 
States government provided few basic precautions to protect 
military personnel from the lethal effects of the nuclear tests.  
These active duty military personnel were, in all respects, being 
handled as human guinea pigs.  It was the goal of the military to 
deduce whether U.S. troops could fight and survive an atomic 
attack.10
In this regard, in the 1950’s the Nevada National Security 
Site was the site for a large military camp containing thousands 
of young active duty military personnel, including marines, 
naval personnel, soldiers, and air force military personnel.  They 
were to witness the heat and blast of the ultimate “doomsday 
weapon,”11 with little thought as to the lethal radiological health 
risks and overall safety of these soldiers, who were exposed 
directly to lethal amounts of radiation.12
Camp Desert Rock was activated in the fall of 1951 for the 
 10.  NAT. NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/NV – 764,
CAMP DESERT ROCK (2011). 
 11.  Id. at 1. 
 12.  Id. at 1–2. 
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“Buster-Jangle” series of nuclear blasts.  These blasts were 
conducted in Yucca Flats, Nevada.  These nuclear test blasts 
involved an atmospheric blast.  Thousands of troop observers 
from all parts of the United States were deployed from Camp 
Desert Rock to witness, at close range, the atomic detonations.  
Incredibly, after the atomic explosions, some of the participating 
troops were marched or bused even closer to “ground zero” to 
see the effects of these atomic explosions on military equipment 
before returning to Camp Desert Rock.13
After discharge from active duty military service, many 
veterans developed forms of cancer and disease for which the 
government had not made adequate resources and care 
available.  And in a very real way, the fallout from these blasts 
continues today. 
This article is dedicated to the thousands of veterans who 
participated in these nuclear test blasts from 1940 through 1970.  
These veterans participated in one of the greatest battles of all-
time—the Cold War between the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and China.  This article is the story of the inherent risks 
and sacrifices that veterans of the atomic test blasts made during 
their participation in the atomic arms race during the height of 
the Cold War.  And now, subsequent to these atomic test blasts, 
modern warfare has been revolutionized and a new race, a race 
to keep the world’s most destructive detonation from any 
intending nation or group, has been birthed. 
B. SUMMARY
Between 1945 and 1962, several thousand service members 
were involved in nuclear weapons training missions14 wherein 
live nuclear bombs or “shots” were detonated.15  This class 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  EMP. EDUC. SYS., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS & RADIATION 43,
141 (2001). 
 15.  See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 9 (“This document lists 
chronologically and alphabetically by name all nuclear tests and simultaneous 
detonations conducted by the United States from July 1945 through September 
1992.”). 
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joined other soldiers involved with the atomic bombing missions 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, the American POWs held in 
these cities, and soldiers who served during the Japanese 
occupation, as victims of radiation exposure.16  These “Atomic 
Veterans,” numbering over 400,000, were exposed to radiation 
either from the initial bomb blast, breathing the radioactive dust, 
ingesting contaminated food and water after the blast, or living 
in the radioactive environment.17
Epidemiological studies initiated in the late 1970s revealed 
that these Atomic Veterans were at an increased risk of 
developing a variety of cancers and chronic diseases, including 
leukemia.18  However, veterans suffering from radiological 
diseases found it difficult to obtain medical benefits from the 
Veterans Administration (VA).19  In response to public sentiment 
and pressure from veterans groups Congress passed the 
Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation 
Standards Act (VDRECSA),20 acknowledging that some veterans 
were exposed to ionizing radiation, and that this exposure could 
be linked to radiological diseases.  Unfortunately, few veterans 
have been able to receive compensation under this Act, 
provoking Congress to pass additional legislation to help 
compensate these veterans, including the Radiation-Exposed 
Veterans Compensation Act of 1988 (REVCA) and the Radiation 
 16.  OFFICE OF PUB. HEALTH (10P3), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ARE YOU 
AN ATOMIC VETERAN? (2012). 
17. COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE DOSE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM OF THE 
DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, A REVIEW OF THE DOSE RECONSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM OF THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY 33–34 (2003), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309089026 [hereinafter REVIEW OF 
DTRA]. 
 18.  See Glyn G. Caldwell et al., Leukemia Among Participants in Military 
Maneuvers at a Nuclear Bomb Test, 244 JAMA 1575, 1577–78 (1980) [hereinafter 
Caldwell et al., Leukemia]. See also SUSAN THAUL ET AL., INST. OF MED., THE FIVE 
SERIES STUDY: MORTALITY OF MILITARY PARTICIPANTS IN U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
TESTS 9 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=9697, for a 
review of government funded entities. 
 19.  See Judi Hasson, Getting the Word Out to Atomic Veterans Exposed to 
Radiation, AARP, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.aarp.org/health/conditions-
treatments/info-11-2011/atomic-veterans-special-benefits-radiation-exposure.html.   
 20.  Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, 
Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (2000)). 
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Exposure Compensation Act of 1990 (RECA).21  The current 
legislation provides Atomic Veterans, who suffer from a few 
specific radiological diseases, an avenue for compensation.  
However, obtaining medical benefits for veterans who suffer 
from radiological diseases not specifically outlined in the 
legislation continues to prove difficult.22  This article reviews the 
legal and scientific challenges veterans face in establishing 
service-connected disability compensation for their radiological 
diseases, suggests a new standard, and provides a case study in 
which a veteran was finally awarded VA benefits for his 
radiological diseases after decades of litigation. 
II. THE SPECIAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE ATOMIC VETERAN
The nuclear bombs dropped in 1945 on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
exhibited the most awesome display of military power in 
recorded history.  Witnesses described a bright white-blue light 
and a concussive blast, followed by a ring of fire and extreme 
heat that incinerated thousands and devastated the cities’ 
 21.  Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
321, 102 Stat. 485 [OR] Pub. L. No. 100-322, 102 Stat. 534 (1988) (codified at 38 C.F.R. 
§ 3.309(d) (2011) and as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006)).  Radiation Exposure 
Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2006) (amended 2000).  The current 
version of RECA is officially entitled The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act 
Amendments of 2000, however, for colloquial ease the amended Act is still referred 
to as RECA. 
 22.  See, e.g., Veterans’ Health Care Improvements Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 1385 
and S. 1822 Before the S. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of 
Dr. Rosalie Bertell, Int’l Inst. of Concern for Pub. Health); PowerPoint: Bradley 
Flohr & Gail Berry, Slide Presentation, Radiation Claims Processing at the VETERANS’
ADVISORY BOARD ON DOSE RECONSTRUCTION MEETING (Mar. 23, 2012), slides 4–5,
available at http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2012/Presentations/6-Flohr_VBDR_ 
Mar12.pdf [hereinafter Flohr 2012]; PowerPoint: Bradley B. Flohr, Slide 
Presentation, Update on VA Radiation Claims Compensation Program for Veterans at the 
VETERANS’ ADVISORY BOARD ON DOSE RECONSTRUCTION MEETING (Mar. 11, 2011), 
slides 6–7, available at http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2011/presentations/Flohr.pdf 
[hereinafter Flohr 2011] (stating that 1,968 claims were granted and 3,683 were 
denied); PowerPoint: Bradley B. Flohr, Slide Presentation, Update on VA Radiation 
Claims Compensation Program for Veterans at the VETERANS’ ADVISORY BOARD ON 
DOSE RECONSTRUCTION MEETING (Mar. 11, 2011), slides 6–7, available at
http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2010/presentations/Flohr_VBDR_Update_March_20
10.pdf [hereinafter Flohr 2010] (stating that 1,648 claims were granted and 2,918 
claims were denied). 
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infrastructure.23  These nuclear weapons not only demonstrated 
the military prowess of the United States, but also symbolized 
the beginning of modern nuclear science and concerns regarding 
radiation exposure.  Many survivors of the initiation blast soon 
succumbed to a mysterious illness, called “radiation sickness,” 
characterized by: nausea, vomiting, headache, dizziness, fatigue, 
fever, and skin burns.24  Through these observations, scientists 
and medical professionals became aware of the unique and 
immediate effects of radiation exposure.25  However, the long-
term effects of radiation were largely unknown.26
Once these Atomic Veterans developed radiation-related 
diseases they turned to the VA to provide them with medical 
care.  However, to receive care a veteran must prove that his/her 
condition is service-connected.27  Generally, this requires that 
there be a nexus between a disease and radiation exposure.28  In 
determining this nexus the VA must consider several factors: 
probable radiation dose, tissues or organs affected, veterans’ 
age, gender and family history, time-lapse between exposure 
and disease onset, and any non-service related activity that may 
have contributed to the development of the disease.29
Regrettably, scientists and veterans have difficulty linking 
radiological diseases to radiation exposure incurred during 
military service.  This difficulty can be attributed to several 
factors, including: (1) the lack of knowledge and the inability to 
measure radiation exposure during the mission; (2) 
misinformation communicated to the veteran and the public 
 23.  See U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 24.  Id. at 16–27.  See also PAUL S. HENSHAW & AUSTIN M. BRUES, ATOMIC BOMB 
CASUALTY COMM., GENERAL REPORT 3 (1947); and JOHN HERSEY, HIROSHIMA 87–118
(1946). 
 25.  See, e.g., Stuart C. Finch, Acute Radiation Syndrome, 258 JAMA 664, 664–65
(1987). See generally STUART FINCH ET AL., ATOMIC BOMB CAS. COMM’N, DETECTION 
OF LEUKEMIA & RELATED DISORDERS, HIROSHIMA & NAGASAKI: RESEARCH PLAN 
(1965). 
 26.  See UNIV. OF WASH. ENVTL. HEALTH & SAFETY, PRINCIPLES OF RADIATION 
PROTECTION Bio-3 (2006).   
 27.  38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2011). 
 28.  38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (2006). 
 29.  38 C.F.R. § 3.311 (2011). 
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about radiation exposure; (3) the oath of secrecy sworn by 
soldiers prohibiting them from discussing their radiation 
exposure with their physicians; (4) the long “incubation period” 
with which many radiological diseases are associated; (5) the 
difficulty associated with retrospectively calculating radiation 
exposure dose; and (6) the variability of radiation exposure 
experienced by veterans, which complicates the scientific 
analysis of linking specific diseases with specific types of 
radiation.30
Unfortunately, in the absence of direct scientific data 
establishing a “cause-and-effect” relationship between radiation 
exposure and radiological disease, the VA has historically 
denied service-connected compensation for this class of injury.31
Even though Congress has enacted various legislation to compel 
the VA and the DOJ to award radiation exposure benefits to 
Atomic Veterans who suffer from certain radiological diseases, 
including VDRECSA and REVCA, compensation remains 
extremely limited.32  This is largely because, with the exception 
of delineated “presumptive diseases,”33 Atomic Veterans must 
still prove a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and a 
current disability. 
 30.  See discussion infra Sections III, IV. 
 31.  Prior to VDRECSA and subsequent legislation, the only option available to 
the veteran was a claim filed for direct service-connection, under 38 U.S.C. Sections 
1110, 1154(a) and 38 C.F.R. Section 3.303.  For radiogenic disease claims, the veteran 
had to show that the disease resulted from in-service exposure to ionizing radiation. 
Veterans and their survivors who attempted to establish direct service-connection 
were seldom successful under that regime because of the severe difficulties of 
proof, including the lack of ready access to scientific and medical evidence about 
the long-term effects of radiation exposure and the lack of reliable information 
about exposure levels. In addition, there was great inconsistency in the way 
radiogenic-disease claims were addressed by the agency's various regional offices. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 98-592, at 7 (1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4449, 4453; 130 
Cong. Rec. 13,147-49 (1984) (statement of Sen. Cranston). 
 32.  Including the Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation 
Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. § 
1154 (2000)); Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-321, 102 Stat. 485 [OR] Pub. L. No. 100-322, 102 Stat. 534 (1988) (codified at 38 
C.F.R. § 3.309(d) (2011) and as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006)); and Radiation 
Exposure Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2006) (amended 2000).   
 33.  38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006). 
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This article argues that the current application of VDRECSA 
and REVCA creates challenges for the Atomic Veteran, often 
precluding the award of service connection.  This is due, in part, 
to the way the VA evaluates the claim, arguably imposing a 
higher standard of review on these claims than was intended by 
Congress.  Rather than reflecting a “likely association” between 
the disease and the radiation exposure, the way in which the VA 
evaluates these factors reflect a heightened “cause and effect” 
standard of review.  Thus, the procedure by which radiation 
cases are reviewed precludes the application of the benefit-of-
the-doubt standard,34 violating expressed congressional 
command.  Therefore, current regulations governing claims 
adjudication should be interpreted or amended to conform to 
the governing statutes and congressional intent.  This would 
ease the burden on Atomic Veterans, subjecting their service-
related compensation claims to the same standard of review that 
other similarly situated veterans (i.e. Vietnam Veterans) 
currently receive under the VDRECSA legislation. 
In summary, this article argues that Atomic Veterans face 
an unnecessary number of challenges in establishing service-
connected disability claims for their radiologic diseases; and 
thus, the VA should adopt a new standard under which these 
claims are evaluated.  In Sections III and IV this article will 
outline the reasons why scientists and veterans have difficulty 
linking radiological diseases to radiation exposure incurred 
during military service.  Next, this article will outline and 
evaluate the various laws that regulate veteran access to 
benefits.  In Section VI the article presents a case study that is 
indicative of the difficulties inherent in a veteran appeal for 
benefits.  Finally, this article suggests the VA use a standard 
similar to dioxin claims when evaluating veteran claims for 
benefits. 
 34.  38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2012). 
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III. MILITARY MISSIONS: RADIATION, SECRECY &
MISINFORMATION
A. RADIATION AND THE LACK OF PROTECTION
Radiobiology is the study of the effects of ionizing radiation 
upon living organisms.35  The field originated and developed, 
along with nuclear science, during the twentieth century.36
Nuclear bombs release radiation in the form of x-rays, gamma 
rays, neutron radiation, beta particles, and alpha particles 
(depending upon the bombs initial composition and the route of 
detonation).37  Through military missions that involved the 
detonation of nuclear bombs, much was learned about how to 
better control the nuclear reactions and the types of radiation 
emitted from the blasts.38  Unfortunately, during these military 
missions little was known about the complexity of radiation 
exposure.  However, the potential for gamma ray radiation was 
known; and, gamma radiation detectors, called “dosimeter 
badges,” were used to measure gamma radiation exposure.39
Worn by soldiers at select locations, the badges were analyzed 
and used to determine radiation fields and to approximate 
gamma radiation doses.40
During these missions, precautions to protect soldiers from 
radiation exposure were either absent or inadequate.41  The 
military adopted the “duck and cover” strategy for protecting 
soldiers, and encouraged veterans to utilize bunkers to avoid 
 35.  WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1873 (3d ed. 2002). 
 36.  See generally Henning Willers & H.-P. Beck-Bornholdt, Origins of 
Radiotherapy and Radiobiology, 38 RADIOTHERAPY & ONCOLOGY 171 (1996) (outlining 
the origins and growth of radiobiology). 
 37.  See generally U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, supra note 6. See also Harold 
L. Brode, Review of Nuclear Weapons Effects, 18 ANN. REV. NUCLEAR SCI. 153, 155 
(1968). 
 38.  U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 9, at viii. 
 39.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 8, 21. 
 40.  Id.
 41.  See, e.g., JONATHAN M. WEISGALL, OPERATION CROSSROADS: THE ATOMIC 
TESTS AT BIKINI ATOLL 230 (1994). See BACK FROM DUTY: OZAUKEE COUNTY’S
VETERANS SHARE THEIR STORIES 14 (Laurie Arendt ed., 2002). 
33718-m
qe_14-2 Sheet No. 12 Side B      07/02/2013   13:56:24
33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 12 Side B      07/02/2013   13:56:24
C M
Y K
PUBLISHED.KABATCHNICK.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2013 5:29 PM 
160 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 14 
flash burns.42  Other protective mechanisms included smoke 
curtains, shoe covers, and showering.43  Although these methods 
may have provided primitive cover from some types of 
radiation, these methods have proven to be largely ineffective 
because the particles and radiation rays emitted from nuclear 
reactions have unique properties.44  Alpha particles are easily 
absorbed by a thin piece of paper or the dead cells of the skin 
and pose little danger to a person fully covered.45  Beta particles 
can be absorbed by clothing, but particles maintain the potential 
to penetrate and burn the skin.46  However, when alpha or beta 
particles are inhaled or ingested the particles can damage 
internal organs.47  Gamma rays, x-rays, and neutrons penetrate 
the skin and are absorbed by the internal organs.48  If alpha 
particles, beta particles, neutrons, gamma rays, or x-rays reach 
living cells, the living cells absorb the radiation.49  The radiation 
then acts in a variety of ways to interfere with normal cellular 
processes, directly killing the cell or damaging the cells’ DNA, 
which can eventually develop into cancer. 
In the absence of adequate protection, soldiers involved in 
these missions were exposed to ionizing radiation in a variety of 
ways.  Veterans exposed to the initial blast were likely irradiated 
with x-rays, neutron and gamma rays, beta particles, and alpha 
particles.50  This type of exposure has been linked to solid 
tumors and leukemia.51  Veterans who inhaled radioactive dust 
likely had radioactive material deposited in their nose, lungs, 
 42.  DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE FACT 
SHEET 2, 8 (2008). 
 43.  DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, supra note 5, 171–72. 
 44.  Radiation Protection Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
rpdweb00/understand/protection_basics.html (last updated July 6, 2012). 
 45.  Radiation Exposure and Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y,
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/medicaltreatments/ra
diation-exposure-and-cancer (last revised Mar. 29, 2010). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id.
 48.  Id.
 49.  Id.
 50.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 5, 21. 
 51.  Id. at 60–63. 
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and bones.52  This material remains in the veterans’ tissues, 
emitting radioactive material for years, eventually causing nasal, 
lung, or bone cancer, and bone disease.53  The Nevada and 
Marshall Island testing sites hosted several training missions 
where radioactivity accumulated in the sand, soil, and water; so, 
soldiers were exposed to large amounts of radioactivity from 
prior and current shots.54  During these missions the soldiers 
lived in radioactive environments, drank and bathed in 
radioactive water,55 and ingested radioactive food.56  These 
veterans are ripe for bladder cancers in addition to the 
commonly associated radiation cancers.57  Most veterans were 
exposed to radiation through several of these activities and, 
thus, are susceptible to a variety of diseases. 
B. THE ROLE OF MILITARY SECRECY
Military secrecy is a unique hurdle for the Atomic Veteran.  
On one hand, secrecy was, and is, deemed requisite to 
patriotism.  On the other hand, the same secrecy compromised 
the veteran’s medical care, access to records, and prevented 
scientists from performing early epidemiological studies.  In 
1940, President Franklin Roosevelt issued an Executive Order, 
which protected information relating to military and naval 
installations.58  Citing the Espionage Act of 1917, Roosevelt set 
the federal government’s classification standards for secrecy, 
and broadly applied secrecy to all government officials.59  After 
 52.  Id. at 32, 34–35. 
 53.  AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR IONIZING RADIATION 9, 42, 57 (1999), 
available at  http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/tp149.pdf. 
 54.  See Frank Munger, Atomic Vet Recalls 1946 Bomb Tests – and Dirty Aftermath,
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2008, http://www.knoxnews.com/ 
news/2008/sep/21/atomic-vet-recalls/. 
55. Id.
 56.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 21, 34. 
 57.  See id. at 22.  See also, e.g., TERRY GREENE ET AL., CANCER AND WORKERS 
EXPOSED TO IONIZING RADIATION: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH LITERATURE 13–16 (2003). 
 58.  Exec. Order No. 8,381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1,147 (Mar. 22, 1940). 
 59.  Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–99 (2006). 
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World War II, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act60 and 
the Invention Secrecy Act,61 noting the national security 
implication of some scientific and technological advances.62  It is 
this legislation that provides the basic framework for protecting 
secrecy related to nuclear weapons testing.  Along with the 
Espionage Act of 1917, this legislation subjects Atomic Veterans 
to penalties for disclosing information related to their 
mission(s).63
Since much of the information related to the nuclear testing 
missions was classified, veterans could not disclose their 
missions.  Therefore, Atomic Veterans could not legally disclose 
their potential radiation exposure during military service.  
Physicians, largely ignorant of the scope of military nuclear 
missions, would not know to ask the veteran about ionizing 
radiation exposure and, therefore, would be less likely to 
consider a radiological disease as a diagnosis.  Additionally, 
 60.  Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2000).   
 61.  Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1994). 
 62.  Id. (authorizing the Commissioner of Patents to keep secret those patents 
on inventions in which the government has an ownership interest and the 
widespread knowledge of which would harm national security).  See generally
JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33502, PROTECTION OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY INFORMATION (2006), and GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 33303, “SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED” INFORMATION & OTHER CONTROLS:
POLICY & OPTIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL INFORMATION (2006), for a more 
detailed discussion of these and other regulatory regimes for the protection of 
sensitive government information.
 63.  18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2006) 
(Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or 
otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or 
uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States 
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United 
States any classified information – (1) concerning the nature, preparation, 
or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or 
any foreign government; or (2) concerning the design, construction, use, 
maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or 
prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign 
government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or 
(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United 
States or any foreign government; or (4) obtained by the processes of 
communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign 
government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes – 
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
both.). 
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because the government had informed the veterans that their 
radiation exposure was not harmful, the veteran would also 
have no reason to suspect the manifestation of a radiological 
disease either immediately or decades later.64  Moreover, many 
veterans refused to believe illnesses and birth defects might have 
been caused by their service.65  As a result, many Atomic 
Veterans’ health and medical treatments were likely 
compromised by the secrecy order. 
The secrecy of these nuclear missions also adversely 
affected the identification of radiation diseases because the 
secrecy order slowed and distorted the flow of information.  The 
independent scientific community, largely unaware of these 
nuclear missions, was not able to study the environmental and 
health effects of the radiation exposure, and scientists and 
medical professionals could not collect data from government 
officials or veterans to link radiation exposure to specific 
diseases.  A small body of governmental medical doctors, 
working under the Atomic Energy Commission, was the only 
group of scientists who had access to the radiological data.66
Unfortunately, these doctors were not collecting Atomic 
Veterans’ medical records to assess the long term medical risks 
associated with radiation exposure, but rather they were 
conducting “research and development in the medical aspects of 
atomic warfare with specific emphasis on human tolerance to 
and protection against radioactivity, decontamination of 
exposed individuals, and treatment of radiation 
casualties . . . .”67  Without the scientific evidence linking 
 64.  See, e.g., Stafford L. Warren, Conclusions: Tests Proved Irresistible Spread of 
Radioactivity, LIFE, Aug. 1947, at 86, 88. 
 65.  Survey Pressed on Illness of Atomic Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1983, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/22/us/survey-pressed-on-illness-of-atomic-
veterans.html. 
 66.  The Research and Development Board, Committee on Medical Sciences 
and Committee on Atomic Energy, Directive Joint Panel on Medical Aspects of 
Atomic Warfare, (Washington 25, D.C 23 Feb. 1949), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/radiation/dir/mstreet/commeet/meet4/brief4.gfr/tab
_o/br4o2a.txt. 
 67.  THE RESEARCH & DEV. BD., DIRECTIVE: JOINT PANEL ON MEDICAL ASPECTS 
OF ATOMIC WARFARE 5 (1949), available at 
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radiation exposure to a particular disease, the VA could not 
award service-connected medical benefits or compensate the 
veteran for his/her suffering.68
In the early 1980s scientists began to publish studies linking 
veterans’ radiation exposure with mortality and cancer,69 which 
prompted congressional inquiries of the Nuclear Weapons 
Testing Program.70  Subsequently, the U.S. Government began to 
declassify documents relating to the program.71  Energy 
Secretary, Hazel O’Leary, characterized the U.S. Weapons 
Testing Program, stating, “[w]e were shrouded and clouded in 
an atmosphere of secrecy. . . . And I would take it a step further: 
I would call it repression.”72  These disclosures provided 
Congress the opportunity to hold further inquiries73 and 
strengthen legislation for compensating Atomic Veterans.74
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/radiation/dir/mstreet/commeet/meet4/brief4.gfr/tab
_o/br4o2a.txt (creating the Joint Panel on Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare). 
 68.  Under the direct service-connection regulation, 38 C.F.R. Section 3.303(d), 
the Veteran is required to produce competent medical evidence sufficient to 
establish a well–grounded claim establishing a causal link to their exposure to
radiation in service.  38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2011); 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (2006).  Thus, the 
veteran would have to submit medical evidence of a nexus between an in-service 
injury or disease and a current disability.  
 69.  See, e.g., Caldwell et al., Leukemia, supra note 18, at 1575–78; Glyn G. 
Caldwell et al., Mortality & Cancer Frequency Among Military Nuclear Test (Smoky) 
Participants, 1957 Through 1979, 250 JAMA 620, 624 (1983) [hereinafter Caldwell et 
al., Smoky].
 70.  See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, 96TH 
CONG., THE FORGOTTEN GUINEA PIGS (Comm. Print 1980). 
 71.  See generally THOMAS B. COCHRAN ET AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOK,
VOLUME 1: U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND CAPABILITIES (1984). The purpose of the 
Nuclear Weapons Databook series is to shed light on the secrecy involving 
information about nuclear weapons.  See also John H. Cushman, Jr., 204 Secret 
Nuclear Tests by U.S. are Made Public., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/08/us/204-secret-nuclear-tests-by-us-are-made-
public.html.  
 72.  John H. Cushman, Jr., 204 Secret Nuclear Tests by U.S. are Made Public., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/08/us/204-secret-nuclear-
tests-by-us-are-made-public.html. 
 73.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-97 (1994). 
 74.  See, e.g., Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation 
Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. § 
1154 (2000)); Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-321, 102 Stat. 485 [OR] Pub. L. No. 100-322, 102 Stat. 534 (1988) (codified at 38 
C.F.R. § 3.309(d) (2011) and as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006)); and Radiation 
Exposure Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2006) (amended 2000).  
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C. MISINFORMATION BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Although the acute effects of radiation exposure were 
revealed through the studies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
scientists have always been concerned with the long-term or 
chronic effects of ionizing radiation.  However, these concerns 
were not directly communicated to veterans or the public.75  In 
fact, U.S. Government agencies assured the public that radiation 
was harmless76 and set forth a campaign to “cure[] [service 
members] of the ‘mystical’ fear of radiation,”77 so “America’s 
atomic war-fighting capability would [not] be crippled.”78  To 
assure service members that radiation exposure was harmless, 
the Army provided brochures to service members to allay their 
fears.79
Publicly, the government assured soldiers that radiation 
was harmless, but an important part of the U.S. Nuclear Testing 
program was to understand the effects of radiation in the theater 
of war.  Thus, various agencies tasked with this job used 
veterans as test subjects and discovered that exposure was quite 
harmful.  For example, the Joint Panel on Medical Aspects of 
Atomic Warfare’s 1949 Directive, listed below, clearly 
 75.  See Warren, supra note 64, at 88 (exhibiting that concerns were not 
communicated).  See also HENSHAW, supra note 24, at 2–3 (exhibiting that even in 
1947, due to previous irradiation experiences, the program had “good reason to 
believe that reproductive disturbances, malignancies of one form or another, 
shortened life span, altered genetic pattern, etc., will in time appear in greater or 
lesser degrees.”). 
 76.  See DEP’T OF CIVIL DEF., SURVIVAL UNDER ATOMIC ATTACK (1951), available 
at http://ia700606.us.archive.org/4/items/survivalunderato00bost/ 
survivalunderato00bost.pdf and Nick Thorpe, Radioactive Fallout to Iron County, UT,
WASH. NUCLEAR MUSEUM & EDUC. CTR., http://toxipedia.org/display/wanmec/ 
Radioactive+Fallout+to+Iron+County,+UT (last updated Nov. 2, 2010), for examples 
of information released to the public. 
 77.  NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR THE PROPULSION OF AIRCRAFT MEDICAL ADVISORY 
PANEL, ACHRE No. DOD-121494-A-2, PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF CREW 
SELECTION RELATIVE TO THE SPECIAL HAZARDS OF IRRADIATION EXPOSURE (July 22, 
1949).   
 78.  ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, at Chapter 10 
(1995), available at http://www.hss.doe.gov/healthsafety/ohre/roadmap/achre/ 
index.html [hereinafter ACHRE]. 
 79.  Id.
33718-m
qe_14-2 Sheet No. 15 Side B      07/02/2013   13:56:24
33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 15 Side B      07/02/2013   13:56:24
C M
Y K
PUBLISHED.KABATCHNICK.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2013 5:29 PM 
166 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 14 
demonstrates a willingness to use veterans as experimental 
subjects: 
BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION
1.  Military Goals 
 1.1  Immediate goals 
The immediate goals are to obtain new and meaningful 
information on the biological effects of ionizing 
radiation concerning: 
 1.1.1 Maximum single and repeated doses of 
radiation which may be tolerated by man with 
reasonable safety. 
 1.1.2 Hazardous doses which may cause incapacity 
for performance of diverse military missions with or 
without permanent damage or death.  Determine 
critical dose to incapacitate within a matter of hours. 
 1.1.3 Casualty-producing doses which should lead to 
evacuation from contaminated areas whenever 
possible. 
 1.1.4.Toxicology of radioactive materials. 
 1.1.5 Effects on man of moderate doses. 
 1.1.6 The effects of radiation as modified by various 
concurrent factors such as burns, trauma, and 
infections, on environments. 
 1.1.7 Effects of radiation on the central nervous 
system and its function in man and mammals. 
 1.2  Future Goals 
The future goal is to understand the biologic 
mechanisms underlying radiation damage, so the 
potential radiation injury may be prevented, minimized 
or treated. 
2.  Deficiencies of Present Equipments and Systems in 
Meeting Requirements 
 2.1  Lack of accurate information concerning effects of 
various dose levels of external radiation on man. 
 2.2  Lack of accurate information concerning 
toxicology of absorbed radioactive materials. 
 2.3  There is lack of existing knowledge concerning 
the combined effects of radiation, thermal, and 
traumatic injury. 
3.  Present Research and Development Program in 
Support of Requirements 
 3.1  The attainment of immediate goals is technically 
feasible provided that effects of moderate dose levels of 
external radiation may be observed on human patients 
and volunteers. 
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 3.2  The obtaining and disinformation of necessary 
information is a military necessity. 
 3.3  Most of the immediate goals can be achieved in 
five years provided there is adequate financial and 
scientific stimulus. 
 3.4  Alternative programs - none. 
 3.5  Some duplication is inevitable and desirable in 
the present state of progress.  The most serious gap is 
failure to secure adequate quantitative data on the 
efforts of ionizing radiation on man. 
 3.6  The program shows no evidence of suffering 
from lack of planning personnel, facilities or money. 
4.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 4.1  Researches in biological effects of radiation 
should be continued. 
 4.1.1  Continue the study of the deterioration of motor 
and sensory functions attending sublethal and lethal 
irradiation in mammals. 
 4.1.2 Decrease the emphasis on primates (monkeys). 
 4.1.3 Increase the emphasis on the mutual influence of 
radiation injury combined with thermal and with 
traumatic injury. 
 4.2  It is still necessary to initiate measurements of the 
effects of moderate doses of radiation in man. 
 4.3  Advantage should be taken of any opportunities 
for the study of the biological effects of radiation 
particularly in man. 
 4.4  Some duplication of effort in all phases of the 
program is justifiable and necessary for rapid progress.  
This refers both to duplication (a) within the Services, 
and (b) between the Services and the world of science.80
In 1994, by Executive Order, President Clinton created the 
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments to 
investigate and report on the use of human beings as subjects of 
federally funded research using ionizing radiation.81  This report 
elucidated, in great detail, the lack of information about ionizing 
radiation and the misinformation communicated to service 
members and the public about the health effects of radiation 
 80.  See generally THE RESEARCH & DEV. BD., supra note 67 (outlining its directive 
that includes using veterans as test subjects). 
 81.  ACHRE, supra note 78, at Executive Summary. 
33718-m
qe_14-2 Sheet No. 16 Side B      07/02/2013   13:56:24
33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 16 Side B      07/02/2013   13:56:24
C M
Y K
PUBLISHED.KABATCHNICK.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2013 5:29 PM 
168 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 14 
exposure.82  It stated: 
Data obtained on some military personnel who were 
exposed to radioactive fallout were collected after these 
men were unintentionally exposed.  However, some 
atomic veterans believe they were used as guinea pigs 
to determine the effects of radiation from various 
distances, including those at ground zero, on human 
subjects.  Their suspicions are supported by a 1951 
document from the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects 
of Atomic Warfare, Research and Development Board, 
Department of Defense, which identified general 
criteria for bomb test-related “experiments” and 
identified 29 “specific problems” as “legitimate basis 
for biomedical participation.” 83
The declassification of the Operation “Castle” Report84 and 
Operation “Upshot-Knothole” Reports85 (among other reports 
prepared during the testing missions) showed that the 
Commission meticulously recorded the troop movements, the 
exposure of service members to ionizing radiation, and potential 
concerns related to ionizing radiation exposure.86
IV. LINKING RADIOLOGICAL DISEASE TO MILITARY SERVICE
A. MANIFESTATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL DISEASE, YEARS 
LATER
Epidemiological studies conducted over the latter half of the 
twentieth century revealed that the deleterious effects of nuclear 
radiation can take decades to manifest, resulting in a variety of 
 82.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON VETERAN’S AFFAIRS, 103D CONG., IS MILITARY 
RESEARCH HAZARDOUS TO VETERAN’S HEALTH? LESSONS SPANNING HALF A 
CENTURY 7 (Comm. Print 1994). 
 83.  Id. at 7 (citation omitted). 
 84.  E. P. CRONKITE ET AL., NAVAL MED. RESEARCH INST. & U.S. NAVAL 
RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LAB., OPERATION CASTLE – FINAL REPORT PROJECT 4.1:
STUDY OF RESPONSE OF HUMAN BEINGS ACCIDENTALLY EXPOSED TO SIGNIFICANT 
FALLOUT RADIATION (1954), available at 
https://www.osti.gov/opennet/servlets/purl/16061854-leUIeE/16061854.pdf. 
 85.  See generally DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, supra note 5 (declassifying Operation 
Upshot-Knothole). 
86. See generally id.; see generally CRONKITE ET AL., supra note 84; see also THAUL
ET AL., supra note 18, at 129-47.
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diseases.87  Leukemia was quickly linked to radiation exposure 
in the 1940s and 1950s.88  However, it was not until the early 
1980s that ionizing radiation was firmly linked to solid tumors 
and cancer,89 initiating a host of new scientific studies.90  Now, 
recent publications link ionizing radiation exposure to many 
diseases, including cardiovascular, respiratory, and digestive 
diseases, avascular necrosis, Alzheimer’s disease, and 
myelodysplastic syndromes.91  As time progresses and statistical 
methods become more sophisticated, epidemiologists will likely 
continue to find new links between radiological exposure and 
disease. 
The long-term effects of ionizing radiation are difficult to 
study in animals, as the animal model selected must be able to 
live long enough for the disease to manifest.  This precludes 
studies in small lab animals like rats or rabbits, which have short 
life spans.  The studies must also be done in a large number of 
animals, due to the low incidence of disease and the variety of 
tissues affected.  There have been some studies using beagle 
dogs92 and monkeys93 to assess the long-term effects of 
 87.  See generally UNIV. OF WASH. ENVTL. HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 26, at
Bio-9.  See generally Evan B. Douple et al., Long-Term Radiation-Related Health Effects 
in a Unique Human Population: Lessons Learned from the Atomic Bomb Survivors of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 5 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS S122 (Supp. 
2011), for a review of several recently published studies. 
 88.  Paul S. Henshaw & James W. Hawkins, Incidence of Leukemia in Physicians, 4 
J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 339 (1944). 
 89.  See Caldwell et al., Smoky, supra note 69, at 621–23. 
 90.  See DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, supra note 5, at 16.  See generally COMM. ON THE 
BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH 
EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR V 1-3 (1996)
(reviewing the significant development in radiation exposure knowledge). See, e.g.,
COMM. ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION:
BEIR VII vii (2006) [hereinafter BEIR VII] (summarizing findings of the health effects 
of low dose x-ray and gamma ray studies initiated in the 1980s and 1990s).
 91.  See generally M. P. Little, Cancer and Non-Cancer Effects in Japanese Atomic 
Bomb Survivors, 29 J. RADIOL. PROT. A43, A44 (2009); Nasrin Begum et al., Does 
Ionizing Radiation Influence Alzheimer’s Disease Risk?, 53 J. RADIOL. RES., 815, 815, 818
(2012); Masako Iwanaga et al., Risk of Myelodysplastic Syndromes in People Exposed to 
Ionizing Radiation: A Retrospective Cohort Study of Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivors, 29 
J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 428, 428, 431–34 (2011). 
 92.  See, e.g., J. H. Diel et al., Influence of Dose Rate on Survival Time for 239PuO2-
Induced Radiation Pneumonitis or Pulmonary Fibrosis in Dogs, 129 RADIATION RES. 53
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plutonium inhalation.  In these studies, animal health has been 
evaluated over a few years, but the studies have been small, 
utilizing only a handful of animals in each study.  Additionally, 
the types of radiation (and how the radiation gets to the tissue) 
complicate these studies.  For example, alpha radiation does not 
penetrate tissue well, unlike gamma radiation, which can 
traverse through inches of tissue and affect tissue deep in the 
body, making for a difficult assessment of disease progression.94
Also, organs have unique sensitivities to radiation, and some 
tissues (e.g., lung, liver, kidney, and bone) concentrate 
radioactive particles.  This results in these organs receiving a 
larger dose of radioactivity, delivered over the course of a 
lifetime.95
Identifying radiological diseases in the human population is 
challenging for the scientific community, as the research requires 
longitudinal epidemiological studies.  Scientists retrospectively 
analyze medical and death records, then they correlate these 
findings with the estimated radiation dose.96  However, this data 
is often erroneous or incomplete.  If death and medical records 
are found they are subject to misdiagnosis and limited by the 
medical knowledge at the time they were recorded.97  Radiation 
(1992). 
 93.  See NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORT ON CARCINOGENS 238 (12th ed. 2011), available at 
http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/twelfth/profiles/IonizingRadiation.pdf(listing 
various experimental animals). 
 94.  EMP. EDUC. SYS., supra note 14, at 10. 
 95.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 101–07. 
 96.  See generally Jonathan M. Samet, Epidemiologic Studies of Ionizing Radiation 
and Cancer: Past Successes and Future Challenges, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 883 
(Supp. 4 1997), for a review of the epidemiological methods used.  See also generally
Steve Wing, Limits of Epidemiology, 1 MED. & GLOBAL SURVIVAL 74 (1994) (describing 
epidemiology as a discipline). 
 97.  See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY.,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 241–
68 (2009). See also PowerPoint: John D. Boice, Jr., Slide Presentation, Review of Atomic 
Veterans Epidemiology Study at the VETERANS’ ADVISORY BOARD ON DOSE 
RECONSTRUCTION MEETING (Mar. 23-24, 2012), slide 10, available at 
http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2012/Presentations/1-Boice_VBDR_Mar12.pdf 
(reporting that of 115,328 atomic veterans surveyed, the VA has epidemiological 
data on only 80,186 (or 69%), the remainder are unknown causes of death). 
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dose estimates are often based on assumptions, with little hard 
data supporting the dose estimate.98  These epidemiological 
studies are also subject to confounding variables like lifestyle 
(e.g., cigarette smoking or radiation exposure from medical x-
rays), age at exposure, and gender, all of which complicate the 
analysis of the results.99  For many years it was thought that a 
low dose of radiation did not increase a person’s risk for 
radiological disease, but a recent government study has changed 
this misconception.100  It is now accepted that there is a strong 
linear dose-response relationship, and even exposure to low 
levels of radiation is dangerous.101  Additionally, the potential 
for intergenerational genetic transmission of radiological 
diseases has been thought to be low, but has been demonstrated 
in animals.102  Thus, the full scope of the effects of radiation 
exposure has yet to be realized by the Atomic Veteran 
population and their families and descendants. 
B. RETROSPECTIVELY ESTIMATING RADIATION DOSE
During the nuclear weapons testing, it was known that a 
variety of radiation was released into the atmosphere and that 
participants were exposed to neutron, gamma, x-ray radiation, 
alpha, and beta particles.103  However, little hard data was 
collected during the nuclear tests to assess radiation exposure.  
Only during the initial bomb blast was a portion of this 
 98.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 3, 30.  See also COMM. ON EVALUATION 
OF THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS,
IMPROVING THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS 
90–91, app. I-51–52 (Jonathan M. Samet & Catherine C. Bodurow eds., 2008), 
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11908.html [hereinafter EVALUATION OF 
PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY].
 99.  See generally Wing, supra note 96 (discussing problems with and limitations 
of epidemiological studies).  See also NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, supra note 93, at 
238.   For example, the young are more susceptible than the old; females are more 
susceptible than males; and risks differ by organ or tissue. 
 100.  See BEIR VII, supra note 90, at 10 (finding health risks associated with 
exposure to low doses of radiation). 
 101.  Id. at 10, 14–15. 
 102.  See generally UNIV. OF WASH. ENVTL. HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 26, at 
Bio-21–23. 
 103.  CRONKITE ET AL., supra note 84, at 15, 24. 
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radiation, the gamma radiation, recorded by the dosimeter 
badges.  A small number of these badges were distributed 
around the battlefield to a few participants to measure where the 
gamma radiation was distributed and how it affected troop 
movements.104  However, most participants were not issued 
badges, and these badges often provided incomplete data.105
The Department of Defense (DOD) created the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to assess veterans’ radiation 
exposure.106  The DTRA’s method for reconstructing radiation 
dose uses existing raw data and assumptions that are input into 
mathematical formulas.  Raw data used includes, for example, 
dosimeter data (gamma radiation detectors), bomb detonation 
data, records of troop movements, and records of environmental 
data including weather reports.107  The DTRA then reports to the 
service member his or her external radiation dose, internal 
radiation dose, and upper bound estimations.108  The methods 
used to estimate radiation dose have been revised many times 
since the first dose estimates were reported in 1978; and, there is 
no systematic way to review earlier dose estimates or apply 
changes retroactively.109
The ability to reconstruct the radiation dose is difficult 
because the lack of raw data, quite naturally, attracts the need 
for many assumptions.  Assumptions include the radiation 
profile emitted from the bomb, the veterans’ location relative to 
the radiation, the duration of the exposure, and theories about 
 104.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 70. 
 105.  Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, 
Pub. L. No. 98-542, § 2, 98 Stat. 2725, 2726 (1984) 
(These film badges often provide an incomplete measure of radiation 
exposure, since they were not capable of recording inhaled, ingested, or 
neutron doses (although the Defense Nuclear Agency currently has the 
capability to reconstruct individual estimates of such doses), were not 
issued to most of the participants in nuclear tests, often provided 
questionable readings because they were shielded during the detonation, 
and were worn for only limited periods during and after each nuclear 
detonation.). 
 106.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 1. 
 107.  See id. at 69–123. 
 108.  Id. at 119–21.  Doses are reported in unit "rem."  Id. at vii. 
109. Id. at 70. 
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how the radioactive particles may distribute in, or on, the 
human body.110  Other assumptions used include, for example, 
posture and position of the service member during exposure, 
breathing rate, and tissue susceptibility to each radiation type.111
It is also assumed that the service members who wore dosimeter 
badges wore them correctly, and the badge was not shielded 
from radiation by clothing, dog tags, or other devices that would 
interfere with radiation detection.112  Service members 
downwind of the explosion were assumed to have likely 
received higher doses of inhaled radiation than service members 
who were upwind.113  Service members who were down in 
bunkers or trenches were assumed to have been protected from 
neutron and gamma radiation compared to those who stood up 
and watched the shot.114  Lastly, how the solider was physically 
positioned (sitting, standing, running) and his breathing pattern 
is included in the radiation dose estimate.115
These assumptions make the dose calculation highly 
speculative and, thus, material when evaluating a reconstructed 
dose – for it is these dose reconstruction estimates that the VA 
considers when evaluating whether a veteran should receive 
service-connected compensation for their non-presumptive 
diseases.116  In 2000, Congress requested a review of the DTRA’s 
dose reconstruction program.  In its 2003 report, the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) was highly critical of the DTRA’s 
methodology and assumptions.117  The NAS identified several 
instances where the DTRA used methods that under-estimated 
veterans’ radiation dose.118  Thus, the radiation dose estimates 
 110.  Id. at 34, 124–230, 367. 
 111.  Id. at 69–123. 
 112.  Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, 
Pub. L. No. 98-542, § 2, 98 Stat. 2725, 2726 (1984). 
 113.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 83–84, 86–101.
 114.  Id. at 66–68, 73–74. 
 115.  Id. at 35, 82, 87–88. 
 116.  Id. at 1, 6–7. 
 117.  Id. at 124–231. 
 118.  Id. at 124–264.  The reader is referred to the finding of the NAS committee 
regarding the numerous limitations related to the dose reconstruction estimate 
methodology used by the DTRA. 
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that the VA relies upon to award benefits are known to be 
inadequate.  However, the VA continues to rely upon these 
calculations in evaluating service-connection for radiogenic 
diseases not specifically outlined in the statutes. 
C. COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
DATA
Based on the existing epidemiological data, there is no 
doubt that radiation exposure causes cancer.119  The few studies 
of Crossroads Atomic Veterans suggest some correlation 
between radiation exposure and leukemia.120  However, the 
probability that an individual’s cancer was a result of radiation 
exposure depends on many factors, including the type of cancer, 
the tissue affected, age at exposure, and other factors of the 
individual.121  The NAS carefully points out that “[g]iven these 
uncertainties of the data on veterans, a negative or inconsistent 
finding cannot be taken as definitive evidence against a causal 
connection, in the face of the wealth of positive evidence from 
other epidemiological studies.”122  The Crossroad studies are 
based on a small number of veterans, and it is difficult to 
demonstrate the small number of excess cancers in small 
populations.123
Linking radiological diseases to radiation exposure during 
military service is additionally challenging, due to the 
confounding variables associated with a lack of reliable 
radiation dose estimates and the nature of the service-connected 
 119.  For a comprehensive list of ionizing radiation epidemiological papers 
considered by the Institute of Medicine, see EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE 
DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-61–63. 
 120.  Caldwell et al., Leukemia, supra note 18, at 1578; Caldwell et al., Smoky, supra
note 69, at 624; COMM. ON THE CROSSROADS NUCLEAR TEST, INST. OF MED.,
MORTALITY OF VETERAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE CROSSROADS NUCLEAR TEST 8 (1996); 
THAUL ET AL., supra note 18, at 77–78.  For a general summary of all studies see
EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-59–61. 
 121.  See BEIR VII, supra note 90, at 14–15; NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, supra 
note 93, at 238.  See also generally Wing, supra note 96 (describing possible 
confounding factors in determining whether cancer was caused by radiation alone). 
 122.  EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-52. 
 123.  Id. at app. I-59. 
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radiation exposure.124  This is because each of the nuclear bomb 
missions had different detonation routes and strengths, resulting 
in distinct decay schemes and radiation emission profiles.125  In 
other words, detonation of the Shot “Badger” exposed service 
members to a different radiation profile and strength than the 
detonation of the Shot Baker.  Veterans were exposed to a 
variety of radiation (alpha and beta particles, gamma, neutron 
and x-ray), doses, and exposure routes.  These factors complicate 
the analysis of epidemiological studies of service members.  
Additionally, not all cancers in a radiation-exposed individual 
are a result of their military service. 
Of the 1,646 claims related to radiation exposure processed 
by the VA in the 1970s and early 1980s, only 30 were granted;126
945 (or 57%) of the denied claims were for solid tumors or 
cancers.127  The claims were denied based on the lack of 
epidemiological data linking radiation exposure with specific 
diseases.  Because of the numerous uncertainties associated with 
estimating individual exposure and calculating the probability 
that their cancer or chronic disease is service-related, Congress 
recognized the need for legislation to aid veteran 
compensation.128
V. RECEIVING COMPENSATION
A. ATOMIC VETERANS’ COMPENSATION: LAWS & REGULATIONS
Veterans can show entitlement to benefits on a direct basis if 
the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in 
service.129  Direct service-connection can be established by 
 124.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 8, 227, 258.  See also EVALUATION OF 
PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-52. 
 125.  See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv., Nuclear Detonation: Weapons, 
Improvised Nuclear Devices, RADIATION EMERGENCY MED. MGMT.,
http://www.remm.nlm.gov/nuclearexplosion.htm (last updated Dec. 21, 2012). 
 126.  130 CONG. REC. 13,147–49 (1984) (statement of Sen. Cranston). 
 127.  Id.
 128.  130 CONG. REC. 29,551 (1984) (statement of Rep. Montgomery). 
 129.  38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2011).   
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“show[ing] that the disease or malady was incurred during or 
aggravated by service,” a task which “includes the difficult 
burden of tracing causation to a condition or event during 
service.”130  However, in the absence of solid epidemiological 
data, this was a preclusive hurdle for most Atomic Veteran 
claims.  In response, Congress passed three additional statutes 
that addressed compensation for veterans who experienced 
radiation exposure during service and have manifest 
“radiological diseases.”  These laws include: VDRECSA,131
REVCA,132 and RECA.133
VDRECSA and REVCA claims are reviewed by the VA.  In 
contrast, RECA claims are reviewed by the DOJ and award a 
lump sum payment to veterans “who contracted certain cancers 
and other serious diseases following their exposure to radiation 
released during the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests.”134  Also, 
the DOJ does not require claimants to establish causation.135  It is 
also important to note that compensation from a RECA DOJ 
claim can adversely affect the potential compensation from 
VDRECSA and REVCA Veterans Administration claims, so 
careful planning is required. 
Originally, veterans who were exposed to ionizing radiation 
had to file for compensation under the strict terms of 
VDRECSA.136  VDRECSA awards compensation only if a 
veteran’s disease is “likely” or “as likely as not” the result of 
 130.  Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
 131.  Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, 
Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (2000)). 
 132.  Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
321, 102 Stat. 485 [OR] Pub. L. No. 100-322, 102 Stat. 534 (1988) (codified at 38 C.F.R. 
§ 3.309(d) (2011) and as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006)).  
 133.  Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2006) 
(amended 2000).   
 134.  See Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/reca.html (last updated Jan. 14, 2013). 
 135.  Id.
 136.  Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, 
Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (2000)).  
This statute does not contain presumptions but directs the VA to adopt regulations 
that would assist veterans who have been exposed to radiation. 
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exposure to radiation while in service.137  This law requires that a 
dose reconstruction and evaluation be conducted on behalf of 
the veteran.  Few veterans have been able to receive 
compensation under these criteria, as it is difficult to establish 
service-connection between the disease, the reconstructed 
radiation dose, and the existing epidemiological data.138
In 1988, Congress passed the REVCA, which established a 
presumption of service-connection for thirteen specific 
cancers.139  Under the presumptive service-connection scenario, 
the veteran has to establish service during one of the specified 
atomic missions and have one of the radiological diseases listed 
in the statute.140  A dose reconstruction is not required or 
considered for a presumptive service disease.  Instead, the 
statute creates a rebuttable presumption that the disease is 
service-connected.141  This shifts the burden of proof to the VA, 
as they must prove that the disease is not service-connected in 
order to deny benefits.  In 1992, two new cancers were added to 
the presumptive list in the statute,142 and now the legislation 
recognizes over 21 radiological cancers.143
The legislation has removed one encumbrance faced by 
veterans seeking compensation, and few presumptive service-
 137.  38 C.F.R. § 3.311 (2011). 
 138.  See Matthew L. Wald, Veterans Nuclear Exposure Underestimated, Panel Says,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at A20 (stating that of 4,000 claims submitted under the 
non-presumptive statute, only 50 have been awarded). 
 139.  Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
321, § 2, 102 Stat. 485, 485 (1988). 
 140.  38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d) (2011). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  SARAH A. LISTER ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33927, SELECTED 
FEDERAL COMPENSATION PROGRAMS FOR PHYSICAL INJURY OR DEATH 26–27 (2008). 
143. Id.
(The 21 cancers presumed to be service-connected for veterans who 
participated in radiation-risk activities are: leukemia (all forms except 
chronic lymphocytic leukemia); cancer of the thyroid, breast, pharynx, 
esophagus, stomach, small intestine, pancreas, bile ducts, gall bladder, 
salivary gland, urinary tract (renal pelvis, urethra, urinary bladder, and 
urethra), brain, bone, lung, colon, and ovary; bronchiolo-alveolar 
carcinoma; multiple myeloma; lymphomas (other than Hodgkin’s disease); 
and primary liver cancer (except if cirrhosis or hepatitis B is indicated).).   
See also 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c)(2) (2006). 
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connection claims have been rebutted.144  Despite the 
presumptive diseases that have been established, many veterans 
still have difficulty establishing service-connection.  These 
veterans are unable to furnish the required evidence of their 
exposure at a specified location and time, in part, because such 
information may be classified as secret or their service records 
are unavailable.145
Radiation-exposed veterans who do not suffer from one of 
the statutorily-defined presumptive diseases must resort to the 
non-presumptive requirements outlined by the VDRECSA or the 
direct service-connection regulations under 38 C.F.R. Section 
3.303(d). VDRECSA identifies a group of “radiogenic diseases”146
and criteria by which the Under Secretary for Benefits will 
consider service-connection.  By identifying particular diseases 
as radiogenic, the regulation relieves the veteran of the need to 
show that the in-service exposure to ionizing radiation was a 
precipitating factor for the disease.  When a veteran manifests 
one of these “radiogenic diseases” within any applicable time 
period, the VA is required to assess the size and nature of the 
radiation dose that the veteran may have received.147  A 
144. EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at 54, 72. 
 145.  Melinda F. Podgor, The Inability of World War II Atomic Veterans to Obtain 
Disability Benefits: Time is Running Out on Our Chance to Fix the System, 13 ELDER L. J. 
519, 533–34 (2005).  For example, on July 12, 1973, a fire at the National Personnel 
Records Center (NPRC) destroyed approximately 16-18 million Official Military 
Personnel Files, including 80% of army veterans’ from WWII.  The 1973 Fire, 
National Personnel Records Center, NAT’L ARCHIVES, www.archives.gov/st-
louis/military-personnel/fire-1973.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2013). 
 146.  38 C.F.R. § 3.311(b)(2) (2011) 
(For purposes of this section the term “radiogenic disease” means a 
disease that may be induced by ionizing radiation and shall include the 
following: (i) All forms of leukemia except chronic lymphatic 
(lymphocytic) leukemia; (ii) Thyroid cancer; (iii) Breast cancer; (iv) Lung 
cancer; (v) Bone cancer; (vi) Liver cancer; (vii) Skin cancer; (viii) 
Esophageal cancer; (ix) Stomach cancer; (x) Colon cancer; (xi) Pancreatic 
cancer; (xii) Kidney cancer; (xiii) Urinary bladder cancer; (xiv) Salivary 
gland cancer; (xv) Multiple myeloma; (xvi) Posterior subcapsular cataracts; 
(xvii) Non-malignant thyroid nodular disease; (xviii) Ovarian cancer; (xix) 
Parathyroid adenoma; (xx) Tumors of the brain and central nervous 
system; (xxi) Cancer of the rectum; (xxii) Lymphomas other than 
Hodgkin's disease; (xxiii) Prostate cancer; and (xxiv) Any other cancer.). 
 147.  See Davis v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 209, 213 (1997); Hardin v. West, 11 Vet. 
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radiation dose estimate from the DOD and other information is 
then forwarded to the Under Secretary for Benefits for review.148
The Under Secretary for Benefits considers various factors and 
may request an opinion from the Under Secretary for Health or 
an outside consultant before ultimately determining whether “it 
is at least as likely as not, or that there is no reasonable 
possibility, the veteran’s disease resulted from radiation 
exposure in service.”149  By requiring the involvement of the 
Under Secretary for Benefits, the regulation attempts to 
harmonize decision-making and give the veteran the benefit of 
the most current scientific and medical studies of radiogenic 
diseases. 
Under 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311(e) the VA is required to 
consider the upper bound calculation in assessing radiation 
claims. Under these regulations, there is a rebuttable 
presumption of service-connection of other “radiogenic 
diseases” if the VA Under Secretary for Benefits determines that 
they are related to ionizing radiation exposure during service.  
According to 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311(e), the factors to be 
considered in determining whether a veteran’s disease resulted 
from exposure to ionizing radiation in service include: 
(1) The probable dose, in terms of dose type, rate and 
duration as a factor in inducing the disease, taking into 
account any known limitations in the dosimetry 
devices employed in its measurement or the 
methodologies employed in its estimation; 
(2) The relative sensitivity of the involved tissue to 
induction, by ionizing radiation, of the specific 
pathology; 
(3) The veteran’s gender and pertinent family history; 
(4) The veteran’s age at time of exposure; 
(5) The time-lapse between exposure and onset of the 
disease; and 
(6) The extent to which exposure to radiation, or other 
carcinogens, outside of service may have contributed to 
App. 74, 79 (1998); Ramey v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1996).
 148.  38 C.F.R. § 3.311(c) (2011). 
 149.  38 C.F.R. § 3.311(c)(2) (2011). 
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development of the disease.150
If a claim is filed based on a disease that is not listed above, 
the “VA shall nevertheless consider the claim under the 
provisions of this section provided that the claimant has cited or 
submitted competent scientific or medical evidence that the 
claimed condition is a radiogenic disease.”151  For instance, one 
disease that the VA has determined not to be a radiogenic 
disease is polycythemia vera.152  The VA, however, is legally 
required to consider a service-connection claim for polycythemia 
vera based on radiation exposure as long as the claimant 
submits competent medical or scientific evidence to support the 
claim.153
B. THE VA INTERPRETS THE LAW TO EVALUATE CLAIMS
For claims that fall within the statutory presumptive 
legislation of REVCA, compensation should be fairly 
straightforward.  However, veterans have nonetheless struggled 
to receive compensation.  During fiscal year 2011-2012, the 
Veterans Advisory Board on Dose Reconstruction reported that 
of 7,715 REVCA and VDRECSA claims accepted for 
adjudication, only 2,210 were granted.154  This is an increase in 
compensated claims compared with the fiscal years 2009-2010 
and 2010-2011.155  Unfortunately, the rate of success for 
 150.  38 C.F.R. § 3.311(e) (2011). 
 151.  38 C.F.R. § 3.311(b)(4) (2011).  The statute goes on to explain that: 
“Sound scientific evidence” means observations, findings, or conclusions 
which are statistically and epidemiologically valid, are statistically 
significant, are capable of replication, and withstand peer review, and 
“sound medical evidence” means observations, findings or conclusions 
which are consistent with current medical knowledge and are so 
reasonable and logical as to serve as the basis of management of a medical 
condition. 
Id. at § 3.111(c)(3). 
 152.  Id. at § 3.311(b)(3). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Flohr 2012, supra note 22, slide 4.  
 155.  Flohr 2011, supra note 22, slide 4; and Flohr 2010, supra note 22, slide 6 (In 
2011, 1,968 claims were granted and 3,683 denied; and, in 2010, 1,648 claims were 
granted and 2,918 claims denied). 
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VDRECSA non-presumptive disease claims cannot be estimated 
because the VA does not keep these records.156  However, 
VDRECSA non-service presumptive disease claims are thought 
to be rarely awarded;157 and, in 2011 claim rejections included 
many skin, prostate, and rectal cancers.158  It is important to note 
that the veteran has the initial burden of proof, and that a person 
who submits a claim for benefits under a law administered by 
the Secretary shall have the burden of submitting evidence 
sufficient to justify a belief, by a fair and impartial individual, 
that the claim is well grounded.159  This is a fairly low standard; 
and, most claims are considered to meet this standard and 
determined to be well grounded.  Nevertheless, claims are 
denied when the Under Secretary of Benefits evaluates the 
evidence.  One need only to visit the Board of Veterans Appeals 
website and search the terms “radiation exposure and related 
decisions” to ascertain the volume of radiological disease claims 
that the VA and BVA have denied.160
VDRECSA non-presumptive disease claim rejection is based 
primarily on the way in which the VA considers the six factors 
outlined in 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311.  Unfortunately, these factors 
provide a plethora of ways in which the VA can deny service-
 156.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 252. 
 157.  Id. at 252—53. 
 158.  PowerPoint: John Lathrop, Slide Presentation, Review of Atomic Veterans 
Demographic Study, at the VETERANS’ ADVISORY BOARD ON DOSE RECONSTRUCTION 
MEETING (Mar. 23, 2012), slide 10, available at
http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2012/Presentations/2-Lathrop_VBDR_Mar12.pdf.  
 159.  38 U.S.C. § 5107 (2006).  See Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 70–71 (1997)  
(The Court has interpreted this burden as the necessity of submitting a 
claim that is “a plausible claim, one which is meritorious on its own or 
capable of substantiation.  Such a claim need not be conclusive, but only 
possible to satisfy the initial burden of § [5107(a)].” Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 
Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990).  Where the determinative issue involves either 
medical etiology or a medical diagnosis, competent medical evidence is 
required to fulfill the well-grounded-claim requirement; where the 
determinative issue is factual in nature, lay testimony may suffice by itself.  
See Grottveit, 5 Vet. App. at 93; Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494–
95 (1992).). 
 160.  See U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Board of Veterans’ Appeals Decisions 
Search, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.index.va.gov/search/va/bva.html 
(search “radiation exposure and related decisions”) (last updated Jan. 17, 2013). 
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connection to a disease.  Often, the VA will reject a claim by 
citing that the DTRA dose reconstruction estimate does not 
support service-connection, even when many of these dose 
estimates were calculated based on theory.161  The DTRA 
contends, and the VA obviously supports the proposition, that 
most Atomic Veterans only received a small amount of radiation 
– an amount lower than that required to cause radiological 
diseases.162  If the service member was a smoker, the VA will 
often deny the claim based on the fact that the veteran smoked, 
asserting that smoking may be as likely to contribute to the 
radiological disease as service-related radiation exposure.163
In many cases, where a veteran suffers from more than one 
type of cancer and/or radiological disease, the claim is denied 
without considering the increased probability of radiological 
causation.164  In other words, the VA does not consider that the 
manifestation of more than one cancer or radiological disease 
suggests radiological causation for both diseases.  This is in 
contrast to the way in which other agencies evaluate radiological 
disease claims, 165 as articulated by the Department of Health 
 161.  EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at 332 (finding that 
the “VA (1) has no formal published rules governing this process, (2) does not 
thoroughly disclose and discuss what “other” medical and scientific information it 
considered, and (3) publishes abbreviated and insufficiently informative 
explanations of why a presumption was or was not granted.”). 
 162.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 3—4. 
 163.  The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) (1998) 
characterized tobacco use by service members as "willful misconduct" so as to allow 
the VA to deny service-related connection of smoking-related illnesses.  The reader 
is referred, generally, to the following references that outline the interesting history 
and issues related to this legislation: DENNIS W. SNOOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-
373 EPW, VETERANS AND SMOKING-RELATED ILLNESSES: CONGRESS ENACTS LIMITS 
TO COMPENSATION (1998); Claims Based on the Effects of Tobacco Products, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 18,195 (Apr. 6, 2001) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3); Naphtali Offen et al., 
“Willful Misconduct”: How the U.S. Government Prevented Tobacco-Disabled Veterans 
From Obtaining Disability Pensions, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1166 (2010). 
 164.  See, e.g., Ramey v. Gober, 120 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Farris v. Principi, 4 
Vet. App 6 (1993); Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67 (1997). 
 165.  See, e.g., Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7384q(b), 7384s (Supp. 4 2006) (establishing a compensation 
program to provide a lump sum payment of $150,000 and medical benefits as 
compensation to covered employees suffering from designated illnesses (i.e. cancer 
resulting from radiation exposure, chronic beryllium disease, or silicosis) incurred 
as a result of their exposures while in the performance of duty for the Department 
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and Human Services: 
Employees diagnosed with two or more primary 
cancers also raise a special issue for determining 
probability of causation.  Even under the assumption 
that the biological mechanisms by which each cancer is 
caused are unrelated, uncertainty estimates about the 
level of radiation delivered to each cancer site will be 
related.  While fully understanding this situation 
requires statistical training, the consequence has simple 
but important implications.  Under this rule, instead of 
determining the probability that each cancer was 
caused by radiation independently, DOL [the 
Department of Labor] will perform an additional 
statistical procedure following the use of IREP 
[Interactive RadioEpidemiological Program] to 
determine the probability that at least one of the 
cancers was caused by the radiation.  This approach is 
important to the claimant because it would determine a 
higher probability of causation than would be 
determined for either cancer individually.166
The way in which the claims are assessed is evidence that 
the VA does not apply the benefit-of-the-doubt standard of 
proof under 38 C.F.R. Section 3.301.  The VA is required to 
consider all the evidence, and assess whether it is “at least as 
likely as not” that the veteran’s disease is connected to the 
radiation exposure.167  The claim can only be denied if a 
preponderance of the evidence is against the claimant.  These 
examples are but a few of the common ways in which the VA 
uses the factors in 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311 to circumvent the 
application of the benefit-of-the-doubt standard under 38 C.F.R. 
Section 3.301 to deny compensation for radiation claims. 
The number and nature of denied claims is truly 
astounding, considering the legislative intent and framework 
governing presumptive as well as non-presumptive claims 
of Energy (‘‘DOE’’) and certain of its vendors, contractors, and subcontractors). 
 166.  Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy 
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, 67 Fed. Reg. 
22,296, 22,298 (May 2, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 81). 
 167.  38 C.F.R. § 3.311 (2011); VETERANS FOR AM., THE AMERICAN VETERANS AND 
SERVICEMEMBERS SURVIVAL GUIDE 79 (2007), available at
http://www.nvlsp.org/images/products/survivalguide.pdf. 
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adjudication.  In passing REVCA presumptive disease 
legislation there was little scientific evidence to support the 
legislation – only the statistical data of excess cancer mortalities 
related to leukemia among atmospheric weapons test 
participants was used.168  “[T]he House Veterans’ Affairs 
Committee concluded that there was a lack of definitive 
exposure data, and decided to concentrate on the likelihood of 
association between cancers and radiation exposures.”169  The 
VA was concerned that the REVCA presumptive legislation 
would require the VA to compensate for an estimated 32,010 
cancers, only a handful of which being potentially caused by the 
radiation exposure.170  However, by passing the presumptive 
disease legislation, Congressional intent clearly supported broad 
compensation.  In signing the bill (H.R. 1811), President Ronald 
Reagan stated: 
Enactment of this legislation does not represent a 
judgment that service-related radiation exposure of 
veterans covered by the Act in fact caused any disease, 
nor does it represent endorsement of a principle of 
permitting veterans to receive benefits funded through 
veterans programs which bear no relationship to their 
former military service. 
Instead, the Act gives due recognition for the unusual 
service rendered by Americans who participated in 
military activities involving exposure to radiation 
generated by the detonation of atomic explosives.  The 
Nation is grateful for their special service, and 
enactment of H.R. 1811 makes clear the Nation’s 
continuing concern for their welfare.171
The VDRECSA non-presumptive disease legislation has 
also been interpreted to support broader compensation for 
dioxin diseases suffered by Vietnam Veterans.  In Nehmer v. U.S. 
Veterans’ Administration, 712 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Cal. 1989), the 
 168.  See generally G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, ATOMIC VETERANS 
COMPENSATION ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. NO. 100-235, at 8 (1987). 
 169.  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, 101ST
CONG., (Comm. Print 1990) app. E (emphasis added). 
 170.  H.R. REP. NO. 100-235, at 8, 10–11. 
 171.  Presidential Statement on Signing the Radiation-Exposed Veterans 
Compensation Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 641, 642 (May 20, 1988). 
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U.S. Federal Courts found that Congress intended the legislation 
to compensate veterans for diseases likely associated with dioxin 
exposure.172  The court found ample evidence that the “cause 
and effect test is also inconsistent with prior VA and 
congressional practice: both the VA and Congress have used a 
‘statistical association’ standard to grant service-connection 
status for other types of diseases.”173  In subsequent legislation174
enacted to further ease the burden of proof for Vietnam 
Veterans, Congress characterized the Nehmer court holding: 
The court held that VA had erred in two key ways in 
carrying out the requirement in P.L. 98-542.  First, by 
utilizing too high a standard for determining if there is 
a linkage between exposure to Agent Orange and a 
subsequent manifestation of a disease and, second, by 
failing to give the benefit of the doubt to veterans in 
prescribing the standards in the regulations for VA to 
use in deciding whether to provide service connection 
for any specific disease.175
The Nehmer decision is an important ruling for Atomic 
Veterans, as many of the congressional statements addressing 
dioxin-exposed veterans cited by the court would also apply to 
Atomic Veterans.176  Unfortunately, VDRECSA has not been 
challenged in the same way by Atomic Veterans.177  Atomic 
 172.  Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin., 712 F. Supp. 1404, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
 173.  Id. at 1418. 
 174.  Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (1991) (codified in 
part at 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000)). 
 175.  SIDATH VIRANGA PANANGALA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41405, 
VETERANS AFFAIRS: PRESUMPTIVE SERVICE CONNECTION AND DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION 14 (2010) (quoting STAFF OF S. COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, 101ST
CONG., VETERANS’ AGENT ORANGE EXPOSURE AND VIETNAM SERVICE BENEFITS ACT 
OF 1989 35 (Comm. Print 1989)). 
 176.  130 CONG. REC. 13,154–73 (1984); 130 CONG. REC. 29,551 (1984) (statement 
of Rep. Montgomery). 
 177.  See Brown v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, No. 95-7067, 1997 WL 488930, at *3 
n.1 (Cal. Fed. 1997).  This was a case brought by a group of atomic veterans that 
challenged the burden of proof used in radiation cases.  The plaintiffs argued that 
the regulations issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs in determining 
eligibility for radiation exposure shall be held unlawful, and the actions, findings, 
and conclusions shall be set aside as they were “arbitrary, capricious . . . and 
contrary to constitutional right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006). The case was dismissed as 
untimely without addressing the merits of the case. 
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Veterans’ claims have likely been evaluated contrary to 
Congressional intent since the regulations were promulgated, 
denying thousands of Atomic Veterans benefits for their service-
connected radiological diseases. 
The standard by which the VA evaluates scientific and 
medical evidence for radiological disease controls the success or 
failure of a veteran’s claim.  A statistical or “likely association” 
has been described as “the observed coincidence in variations 
between exposure to the toxic substance and the adverse health 
effects is unlikely to be a chance occurrence or happenstance.”178
This is in contrast to the cause-and-effect relationship, which 
“describes a much stronger relationship between exposure to a 
particular toxic substance and the development of a particular 
disease.”179  It is clear that Congress intends for the VA to apply 
the lower, likely association, standard to radiological claims, 
although the standard has not been challenged and reviewed by 
the federal courts. 
The way in which the VA Under Secretary for Benefits 
denies radiogenic disease claims demonstrates that a heightened 
standard of proof, that of cause-and-effect, is likely being 
applied to evaluate radiological claims.  In other words, by 
applying the six factors outlined in 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311, and 
assessing these factors, the VA is effectually applying a cause-
and-effect standard to determine whether a radiogenic disease is 
related to ionizing radiation exposure.  This is evident, for 
example, by the denial of claims for prostate cancer180 (diseases 
that are associated with radiation exposure)181 where the claim 
asserts a relatively low radiation dose estimate.182  The clear 
implication is that the VA places more value in the suspect dose 
 178.  Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin., 712 F. Supp. 1404, 1416 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
 179.  Id.
 180.  Flohr 2012, supra note 22, slide 13.  
 181.  EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-89; see also 
Elaine Ron et al., Skin Tumor Risk Among Atomic-Bomb Survivors in Japan, 9 CANCER 
CAUSES & CONTROL 393, 398—99 (1998) (finding that skin cancer is associated with, 
and can be caused by, ionizing radiation as well). 
 182.  EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at 90. 
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estimate and minimizing epidemiological data showing 
association between radiation exposure and these diseases.  
Thus, the VA requires stronger epidemiological evidence than is 
required by VDRECSA to award claims for radiation exposure.  
Thus, Atomic Veterans’ claims are subject to a higher standard 
of proof than dioxin-exposed Vietnam Veterans evaluated under 
the same statutory framework of VDRECSA.183
VI. CASE STUDY: ONE ATOMIC VETERAN’S 24-YEAR FIGHT FOR 
COMPENSATION
The scientific challenges outlined herein are best illustrated by a 
recent case before the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA).184
A. FACTS OF THE CASE
A veteran was awarded service-connected disability 
benefits for diseases attributed to radiation exposure, including 
avascular necrosis of the femoral head, breathing problems, and 
an increased rating for skin cancer, among other claims.  The 
 183.  In response to the holding in Nehmer Congress passed the Agent Orange 
Act of 1991, establishing a new process for the evaluation of dioxin cases that relies 
upon the NAS to help review the scientific evidence and establish presumptions 
based on the standard of "statistical association" instead of "cause and effect."  
Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (1991) (codified in part at 
38 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000)). 
 184.  Citation No. 0911154 (eDecision Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.va.gov/ 
vetapp09/files2/0911154.txt (Bd. of Veterans Appeals).  Professor Craig Kabatchnick 
was long-time counsel for the widow and her husband at the time of the hearing 
before the Board of Veterans Appeals and the subsequent decision granting relief.  
Professor Kabatchnick qualified one of his students in the North Carolina Central 
University School of Law Veterans Law Program, specifically Michelle 
Fitzsimmons, as an expert.  Given her vast background in nuclear medicine and 
physics, especially in view of the fact that Dr. Fitzsimmons earned her Ph.D. in 
Inorganic Chemistry from Wake Forest University where her doctoral research 
focused on the synthesis and characterization of metal complexes for use in nuclear 
medicine, she served as an excellent expert.  Correspondingly, some facts and 
procedural details may not be found in the citation above.  Unless otherwise 
footnoted, all facts in this section may be found in the above cited case or are 
personal knowledge of the authors.  The authors are currently working to garner 
accrued benefits for the widow of the veteran in this case.  Should the reader like 
more information on her case see Craig M. Kabatchnick & Jonathan B. Kelly, 
Unsung Survivors: VA Advocacy for the Spouses, Widows, and Children of Elderly 
Veterans, 13 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 243, 251–56 (2012). 
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claims, initiated in 1980, were accompanied by a radiation dose 
reconstruction estimate prepared by the DTRA, and five 
professional medical opinions.  The medical opinions supported 
the conclusion that the diseases were attributable to radiation 
exposure.  The VA Under Secretary for Benefits denied the 
claims.  However, on appeal in 2009, the BVA ruled in favor of 
the veteran for avascular necrosis and skin cancer.  Avascular 
necrosis is a radiation exposure-related disease not listed as a 
presumptive disease in REVCA, VDRECSA, or 38 C.F.R. Section 
3.311. 
The veteran was a member of the Marine Corps “C” 
Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, whose mission was aborted 
due to excessive radiation exposure during Operation Upshot-
Knothole, Shot Badger.  The Claimant was 4,500 yards from Shot 
Badger and, after detonation, his battalion was ordered to 
charge towards ground zero.  The battalion advanced about 500 
yards before the winds shifted, and the marines were 
unexpectedly subjected to excessive radiation exposure.  After 
the mission was aborted, the marines remained on-site for an 
additional five and-a-half hours and then returned to Camp 
Desert Rock (near the test site). 
Seven years after being exposed to radiation, when the 
veteran was 27 years old, he began to have hip and skeletal pain, 
eventually becoming bed ridden at the age of 44.  The veteran 
was eventually diagnosed with bilateral avascular necrosis of 
the femoral head, requiring bilateral hip replacement.  His other 
skeletal diseases included arthralgia of the cervical and dorsal 
spine, and bursitis of the left shoulder.  In 1978, the veteran 
began suffering from nosebleeds, nasal and facial dermatitis, 
basal cell carcinoma and malignant melanoma, and recurrent 
lesions of his ears, cheeks, and arms.  After leaving the Marine 
Corps, the veteran submitted evidence to the VA of 
progressively deteriorating health effects due to a variety of 
radiogenic diseases, which included fifteen skeletal surgeries 
and seven additional surgeries. 
The veteran submitted scientific publications and five 
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medical opinions linking avascular necrosis (bone death) to 
radiation exposure.  The radiation, inhaled through the veteran’s 
lungs, likely lodged in his bones. Inhaled plutonium 
preferentially distributes in the femoral head and lung tissue, 
irradiates over a period of years, and eventually destroys the 
tissue.185  The scientific literature showed that avascular necrosis 
has been seen in the femoral head with the administration of just 
a small amount of radiation.186  Additionally, tissue necrosis can 
develop when the radionuclide inhaled is either plutonium or 
strontium oxide.187  Unfortunately, there is no suitable data 
available correlating the dose of inhaled radioactive plutonium 
and strontium oxide dose necessary to cause avascular necrosis. 
Idiopathic avascular necrosis is extremely rare in healthy 
individuals, and most cases are associated with alcoholism or 
hypercortisonism188 (neither of which the veteran suffered).  A 
sizable number of avascular necrosis cases are a result of trauma, 
including trauma from radiation exposure.189  Bilateral avascular 
necrosis is generally seen with disease processes, including 
radiation exposure.190  “The radiation tolerance of the femoral 
head is substantially lower than the radiation tolerance of long 
 185.  James F. McInroy, A True Measure of Exposure: The Human Tissue Analysis 
Program at Los Alamos, 23 LOS ALAMOS SCI. 235, 243–44 (1995). 
 186.  UW MSK Resident Projects, Radiation Changes to Bone, UNIV. OF WASH.
MUSCULOSKELETAL RADIOLOGY (last updated Aug. 4, 2005), 
http://uwmsk.org/residentprojects/radiationchanges.html (stating that avascular 
necrosis of the femoral head and fractures of the femoral neck have been seen with 
as little as 16 Gy of external radiation). 
 187.  AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, supra note 53, at 103, 
122–23. 
 188. See Thomas Parker Vail & Diane Beal Covington, The Incidence of 
Osteonecrosis, in AM. ORTHOPAEDIC ASS’N, OSTEONECROSIS – ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS,
AND TREATMENT 43, 44 (James R. Urbaniak & John Paul Jones, Jr. eds., 1997); Yoshio 
Hirota et al., Idiopathic Osteonecrosis of the Femoral Head: Nationwide Epidemiologic 
Studies in Japan, in AM. ORTHOPAEDIC ASS’N, OSTEONECROSIS – ETIOLOGY,
DIAGNOSIS, AND TREATMENT 51, 53, 57 (James R. Urbaniak & John Paul Jones, Jr. 
eds., 1997). 
 189.  Michael R. Aiello, Imaging in Avascular Necrosis of the Femoral Head,
MEDSCAPE REFERENCE, http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/386808-overview 
(last updated May 25, 2011). 
 190.  Peter G. Harper et al., Avascular Necrosis of Bone Caused by Combination 
Chemotherapy Without Corticosteroids, 288 BRITISH MED. J. 267, 267 (1984). 
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bones.”191 The femoral head requires a relatively smaller amount 
of radiation to result in avascular necrosis.192
Regarding the respiratory problems, the veteran submitted 
scientific publications indicating that both human and animal 
studies of inhaled plutonium indicate irreparable damage to the 
respiratory tract and nasal passage.193  These studies also 
indicated that inhaled plutonium distributed in the lung tissue, 
and depending on the particle size and characteristics, remains 
in the lungs and continues to irradiate for years.194  Generally 
speaking, “[t]he lungs are particularly sensitive to irradiation.”195
Although the veteran smoked cigarettes, the damage caused by 
the radiation exposure to the lungs from Shot Badger could be 
significantly larger than the damage from the cigarettes.  
However, as cited previously by NAS, the error associated with 
the internal dose calculations of plutonium refute internal dose 
calculations.196  The veteran did not submit medical opinions 
with the diagnosis of a specific radiological disease of the lung 
and breathing passages. 
Additionally, the veteran was requesting a disability rate 
increase for skin cancer, to which he was already receiving 
service-connected compensation.  The requested increase was 
based on the progression of the skin diseases and resulting 
disfigurement. 
B. VA EVALUATION
The veteran had diseases that were not listed as 
 191.  Mark A. Engleman et al., Radiation-Induced Skeletal Injury, in RADIATION 
TOXICITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 155, 160 (William Small Jr. & Gayle E. Woloschak 
eds., 2006). 
 192.  UW MSK Resident Projects, supra note 186. 
 193.  See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR PLUTONIUM 13–14 (2010) 
(discussing the publications that supported the veteran’s assertion). 
 194.   See id. at 10, 13–14; see also McInroy, supra note 185, at 244. 
 195.  Jeffrey Bradley & Benjamin Movsas, Radiation Pneumonitis and Esophagitis in 
Thoracic Irradiation, in RADIATION TOXICITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 43, 45 (William 
Small Jr. & Gayle E. Woloschak eds., 2006). 
 196.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 148, 178, 182, 190, 204. 
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presumptive diseases under REVCA.  Thus, the claim was 
assessed under VDRECSA, and 38 C.F.R. Sections 3.311 and 
3.303(d).  The veteran’s claim included evidence of service-
connection through the submission of service records and a 
radiation dose reconstruction estimate.  The scientific and 
medical evidence submitted to associate the radiological disease 
with radiation exposure included physician statements and 
scientific publications.  The VA denied the veteran’s claims, as 
discussed below. 
The veteran’s service records established that the claim was 
to be evaluated as a radiological claim.  The dose reconstruction 
estimate was initially performed in 1978 by the Defense Nuclear 
Agency and was revised downward by the DTRA in 2005.  The 
dose estimate included: (1) total external dose, (2) dose estimate 
for skin exposure limited to the face and ears, and (3) an internal 
dose estimate.  The “total external dose estimate” and the “dose 
estimate for the skin” used available dosimeter data, reflecting 
gamma, beta, and neutron radiation emitted from Shot Badger.  
The internal dose estimate was based on theoretical calculations 
for inhaled and ingested radioactive particles.  However, the 
radiation dose estimates were relatively low. 
As for the avascular necrosis, the VA reasoned that the 
veteran’s radiation dose estimate was too low to be service-
connected.  The VA based its arguments on the radiation 
associated with avascular necrosis resulting from fractional 
radiotherapy and radionuclide irradiation.  These procedures 
expose the whole body to radiation.197  A large dose is required 
to achieve irradiation of the bone and the unintended avascular 
necrosis because of an uncontrolled environment.198  These 
procedures are unlike the inhaled dose of bone-seeking 
radioactive plutonium and radioactive strontium to which the 
 197.   Understanding Radiation: Health Effects, U.S. EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/understand/health_effects.html (last updated Aug. 7, 
2012). 
 198.  See, e.g., H. J. G. Bloom, Section of Pathology with Section of Radiology, 
Discussion on the Changes Produced in Tissue by Irradiation, 52 PROCEEDINGS ROYAL 
SOC’Y. MED. 495, 497–98 (1959). 
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veteran was exposed.199
By citing the importance of the veteran’s radiation dose 
estimate, the VA emphasized the importance of the dose 
estimate in their evaluation.  However, the VA did not evaluate 
the weaknesses associated with the calculations.  NAS and the 
Committee to Review the Dose Reconstruction Program of the 
DTRA concluded that there were several incorrect assumptions 
made in the calculation of internal doses.200  Most importantly, 
the errors in the calculation were so substantial that they 
rendered the veteran’s dose reconstruction estimate 
meaningless.201
C. BVA EVALUATION
When the VA denies a claim, the veteran has the option of 
appealing the decision to the BVA.  If the BVA denies the claim, 
the claimant can appeal, sequentially, to the Court of Appeals 
for Veterans Claims (CAVC), United States Court of Appeals 
Federal Circuit, and United States Supreme Court.  The courts 
require the claimant to articulate his/her argument under 
specific legal causes of actions that describe violations of the law.  
Common issues on appeal against the VA include: clear and 
unmistakable error, failure to apply the benefit-of-the-doubt 
standard, and failure to provide a “reason or basis” for the 
decision(s). 
In this case, the veteran argued the following to the BVA: (1) 
the VA committed clear and unmistakable error in denying the 
claim, because the correct facts were not before the VA.  The VA 
used the wrong data to evaluate the radiologic effects of 
avascular necrosis and the skin diseases.  The VA did not 
consider the inaccuracy of the inhalation dose estimate, and did 
199.  See id.; Lisa Bodei et al., EANM Procedure Guideline for Treatment of 
Refractory Metastatic Bone Pain, 35 EUR. J. NUCL. MED. MOL. IMAGING 1934, 1935 
(2008) (explaining that bone pain can be treated with radiotherapy and this 
radiotherapy effect).  
 200.  REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 168, 169, 182. 
 201.  The assumptions used to calculate the dose reconstruction estimate render 
the dose estimate subject to 400% error.  
33718-m
qe_14-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A      07/02/2013   13:56:24
33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A      07/02/2013   13:56:24
C M
Y K
PUBLISHED.KABATCHNICK.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2013 8:37 AM 
2013] RADIOACTIVE VETERANS 193 
not evaluate the radiation dose estimate for the lung or nasal 
passages; (2) the VA committed clear and unmistakable error in 
denying the claim, as the VA misapplied the law.  The VA did 
not correctly apply 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311, as the statutory 
factors were not wholly considered in determining service 
connection.  Specifically, the limitation in the inhaled radiation 
dose estimate methodologies and measurements were not 
adequately considered, the relative sensitivity of the involved 
tissue to induction, by ionizing radiation, of the specific 
pathology, the time-lapse between exposure and onset of the 
disease and the extent to which exposure to radiation, or other 
carcinogens, outside of service may have contributed to 
development of the disease; (3) the VA committed clear and 
unmistakable error, as the VA failed to properly apply the 
Burden of Proof standard, under 38 C.F.R. 3.301; (4) the VA 
failed to apply the benefit of the doubt standard, as codified in 
38 U.S.C. Section 5107(b) and 38 C.F.R. Section 3.102; and (5) the 
VA failed to explain their reasons or basis for the arrival at their 
decision for avascular necrosis and claimants breathing 
problems. 
Based on the evidence presented the BVA awarded service-
connection for avascular necrosis of the bilateral hips, as well as 
increased compensation for residuals of basal cell carcinoma of 
the face, head, and right forearm.202  Unfortunately, service-
connected compensation for the respiratory problems was 
denied, as the BVA found that the medical opinion did not 
articulate a particular radiological disease.203  This case is unique, 
as it is demonstrative of radiation claims that were adjudicated 
 202.   These awards were based on the following statutes:  
38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 5107 (2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.309 (2011) (all 
statutes establishing a basis for service-connection for avascular necrosis of the 
bilateral hips); and 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107(b) (2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.3, 4.118 (2002) 
(all statutes establishing a basis for increased compensation for residuals of basal 
cell carcinoma of the face, head, and right forearm).  Ratings are under the 7800 and 
7803 diagnostic code series in the Schedule for Rating Disabilities.  38 C.F.R. § 4.118 
(2011). 
 203.   38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 5107 (2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 
3.309, 3.311 (2011) (delineating the necessity of a particular radiological disease). 
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under both 38 C.F.R. Section 3.303(d)204 and VDRECSA 
regulations. 
Notably, in adjudicating the claims, the BVA found, as a 
matter of law, that avascular necrosis was not a listed 
presumptive condition under 38 C.F.R. Sections 3.309 or 3.311, 
but the veteran was able to show entitlement to benefits on a 
direct basis under 38 C.F.R. Section 3.303(d).205  The Board found 
that: 
[A]lthough the evidence of record reflects a fairly low 
dose of radiation, relative to the levels discussed in the 
studies relied upon by the appellant, the evidence does 
support a finding that it is scientifically sound to relate 
the development of avascular necrosis of the femoral 
head/hip to radiation exposure, as a general principle.  
Moreover, numerous private doctors have opined, after 
reviewing the Veteran’s medical history and his 
exposure to radiation, and conducting examinations, 
that in his particular case it is likely that radiation 
played a role in causing the currently diagnosed 
bilateral hip disability.206
This case is an important case for the Atomic Veteran 
community and it demonstrates the scientific and legal 
challenges associated with non-presumptive, complex radiation 
claims.  As exemplified in this case, for a radiological disease 
claim to be properly evaluated, the claim should include 
physician statements and solid scientific literature that associates 
the disease with radiation exposure.  Since radiation exposure is 
linked with a variety of chronic diseases, the VA may not 
immediately identify the disease as a radiological disease.  For 
this reason, even with the proper evidence, these claims are 
often denied, requiring further appeal for justice. 
 204.  Direct service-connection. 
 205.  The veteran employed the strategies outlined in Combee.  Combee v. 
Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043–44 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 206.  Citation No. 0911154 (eDecision Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://www.va.gov/vetapp09/files2/0911154.txt (Bd. of Veterans Appeals).   
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VII. ARGUMENTS FOR A NEW STANDARD
The VA should evaluate radiologic disease claims similar to the 
way in which dioxin disease claims are currently evaluated, 
because of the similarities in establishing service-connection.  
These veterans are similarly situated, as both sets of veterans 
face the challenges outlined in Sections III and IV, including: (1) 
The lack of knowledge and the inability to measure exposure 
during the mission; (2) misinformation communicated to the 
veteran and the public about the health risks; (3) the oath of 
secrecy soldiers swore, prohibiting them from discussing their 
exposure; (4) the long “incubation period” with which these 
diseases are associated; (5) the difficulty associated with 
assessing exposure dose; and (6) the variability of exposure 
experienced by the veteran, which complicates the scientific 
analysis of linking specific disease with exposure.  In 1991, 
Congress acknowledged these challenges for Vietnam Veterans 
and passed the Agent Orange Act.207  This legislation requires 
the VA to work with NAS to review and summarize available 
scientific evidence regarding an association between disease and 
exposure to herbicides used in Vietnam. 
NAS, through an Institute of Medicine (IOM) committee, 
examines and characterizes the strength of the scientific and 
medical evidence relating to dioxin exposure into the following 
four categories: “(1) sufficient evidence of an association, (2) 
limited/suggestive evidence of an association, (3) 
inadequate/insufficient evidence to determine whether an 
association exists, and (4) limited/suggestive evidence of no
association.”208  IOM was additionally contracted to explore 
possible links between service in the Gulf War I and a host of 
medical conditions experienced by veterans known collectively 
 207.  Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (1991) (codified in 
part at 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000)). 
 208.  EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at 64 (quoting 
COMM. TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO 
HERBICIDES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: HEALTH EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES USED 
IN VIETNAM 6–7 (1994)). 
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as “Gulf War Syndrome.”  The IOM committees conducted the 
Gulf War I studies using a similar categorization process that 
included: “(1) sufficient evidence of a causal relationship, (2) 
sufficient evidence of an association, (3) limited/suggestive 
evidence of an association, (4) inadequate/insufficient evidence 
to determine whether an association does or does not exist, and 
(5) limited/suggestive evidence of no association.”209  If the VA 
adopted this type of approach to evaluate non-presumptive 
disease radiation claims, the evaluation process would better 
conform to congressional intent, current statutes, and applicable 
regulations.210
VIII. CONCLUSION
Atomic Veterans face an unnecessary number of challenges in 
establishing service-connected disability claims for their 
radiological diseases.  The current legislation, as implemented 
by the VA, does not provide an appropriate mechanism for the 
proper adjudication of radiation claims.  Because these claims 
involve the evaluation of complex scientific evidence, the VA 
should adopt a new standard under which these claims are 
evaluated, similar to the way in which dioxin claims are 
evaluated.  Implementation of this standard would realize 
congressional intent and provide Atomic Veterans with the same 
standard of proof applied to dioxin claims. 
 209.  Id. at 65 (quoting 1 COMM. ON HEALTH EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
EXPOSURES DURING THE GULF WAR, GULF WAR AND HEALTH: DEPLETED URANIUM,
SARIN, PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE, VACCINES 4–5 (Carolyn E. Fulco et al. eds., 2000)). 
 210.  Specifically, VDRECSA and 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2006). 
